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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/2] xenbus: req->body should be updated before req->state



Hi,

On 03/03/2020 18:47, Dongli Zhang wrote:
The req->body should be updated before req->state is updated and the
order should be guaranteed by a barrier.

Otherwise, read_reply() might return req->body = NULL.

Below is sample callstack when the issue is reproduced on purpose by
reordering the updates of req->body and req->state and adding delay in
code between updates of req->state and req->body.

[   22.356105] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   22.361185] CPU: 2 PID: 52 Comm: xenwatch Not tainted 5.5.0xen+ #6
[   22.366727] Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS ...
[   22.372245] RIP: 0010:_parse_integer_fixup_radix+0x6/0x60
... ...
[   22.392163] RSP: 0018:ffffb2d64023fdf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   22.395933] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 75746e7562755f6d RCX: 0000000000000000
[   22.400871] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffb2d64023fdfc RDI: 75746e7562755f6d
[   22.405874] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000001e8 R09: 0000000000cdcdcd
[   22.410945] R10: ffffb2d6402ffe00 R11: ffff9d95395eaeb0 R12: ffff9d9535935000
[   22.417613] R13: ffff9d9526d4a000 R14: ffff9d9526f4f340 R15: ffff9d9537654000
[   22.423726] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d953bc80000(0000) 
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   22.429898] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   22.434342] CR2: 000000c4206a9000 CR3: 00000001ea3fc002 CR4: 00000000001606e0
[   22.439645] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   22.444941] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   22.450342] Call Trace:
[   22.452509]  simple_strtoull+0x27/0x70
[   22.455572]  xenbus_transaction_start+0x31/0x50
[   22.459104]  netback_changed+0x76c/0xcc1 [xen_netfront]
[   22.463279]  ? find_watch+0x40/0x40
[   22.466156]  xenwatch_thread+0xb4/0x150
[   22.469309]  ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
[   22.472198]  kthread+0x10e/0x130
[   22.474925]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
[   22.477946]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[   22.480968] Modules linked in: xen_kbdfront xen_fbfront(+) xen_netfront 
xen_blkfront
[   22.486783] ---[ end trace a9222030a747c3f7 ]---
[   22.490424] RIP: 0010:_parse_integer_fixup_radix+0x6/0x60

The barrier() in test_reply() is changed to virt_rmb(). The "while" is
changed to "do while" so that test_reply() is used as a read memory
barrier.

Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
Changed since v1:
   - change "barrier()" to "virt_rmb()" in test_reply()

  drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_comms.c |  2 ++
  drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c    | 11 +++++++----
  2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_comms.c 
b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_comms.c
index d239fc3c5e3d..852ed161fc2a 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_comms.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_comms.c
@@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ static int process_msg(void)
                        req->msg.type = state.msg.type;
                        req->msg.len = state.msg.len;
                        req->body = state.body;
+                       /* write body, then update state */
+                       virt_wmb();
                        req->state = xb_req_state_got_reply;
                        req->cb(req);
                } else
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c
index ddc18da61834..1e14c2118861 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xenbus/xenbus_xs.c
@@ -194,15 +194,18 @@ static bool test_reply(struct xb_req_data *req)
        if (req->state == xb_req_state_got_reply || !xenbus_ok())
                return true;
- /* Make sure to reread req->state each time. */
-       barrier();
+       /*
+        * read req->state before other fields of struct xb_req_data
+        * in the caller of test_reply(), e.g., read_reply()
+        */
+       virt_rmb();

Looking at the code again, I am afraid the barrier only happen in the false case. Should not the new barrier added in the 'true' case?

Cheers,

--
Julien Grall

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