|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 1/2] nvmx: implement support for MSR bitmaps
On Mon, Feb 03, 2020 at 08:05:48AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> > From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 29, 2020 10:45 PM
> >
> > Current implementation of nested VMX has a half baked handling of MSR
> > bitmaps for the L1 VMM: it maps the L1 VMM provided MSR bitmap, but
> > doesn't actually load it into the nested vmcs, and thus the nested
> > guest vmcs ends up using the same MSR bitmap as the L1 VMM.
> >
> > This is wrong as there's no assurance that the set of features enabled
> > for the L1 vmcs are the same that L1 itself is going to use in the
> > nested vmcs, and thus can lead to misconfigurations.
> >
> > For example L1 vmcs can use x2APIC virtualization and virtual
> > interrupt delivery, and thus some x2APIC MSRs won't be trapped so that
> > they can be handled directly by the hardware using virtualization
> > extensions. On the other hand, the nested vmcs created by L1 VMM might
> > not use any of such features, so using a MSR bitmap that doesn't trap
> > accesses to the x2APIC MSRs will be leaking them to the underlying
> > hardware.
> >
> > Fix this by crafting a merged MSR bitmap between the one used by L1
> > and the nested guest.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > This seems better than what's done currently, but TBH there's a lot of
> > work to be done in nvmx in order to make it functional and secure that
> > I'm not sure whether building on top of the current implementation is
> > something sane to do, or it would be better to start from scratch and
> > re-implement nvmx to just support the minimum required set of VTx
> > features in a sane and safe way.
>
> without knowing what "a lot of work" actually means, it's difficult to
> judge which way is better. But from the listed changes in this series,
> I think they are reasonable.
>
> > ---
> > Changes since v1:
> > - Split the x2APIC MSR fix into a separate patch.
> > - Move setting MSR_BITMAP vmcs field into load_vvmcs_host_state for
> > virtual vmexit.
> > - Allocate memory with MEMF_no_owner.
> > - Use tabs to align comment of the nestedvmx struct field.
> > ---
> > xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h | 3 +-
> > 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> > index 47eee1e5b9..c35b4bab84 100644
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
> > @@ -128,6 +128,16 @@ int nvmx_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
> > unmap_domain_page(vw);
> > }
> >
> > + if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap )
> > + {
> > + nvmx->msr_merged = alloc_domheap_page(d, MEMF_no_owner);
> > + if ( !nvmx->msr_merged )
> > + {
> > + gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "nest: allocation for MSR bitmap
> > failed\n");
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > nvmx->ept.enabled = 0;
> > nvmx->guest_vpid = 0;
> > nvmx->vmxon_region_pa = INVALID_PADDR;
> > @@ -182,6 +192,11 @@ void nvmx_vcpu_destroy(struct vcpu *v)
> > free_domheap_page(v->arch.hvm.vmx.vmwrite_bitmap);
> > v->arch.hvm.vmx.vmwrite_bitmap = NULL;
> > }
> > + if ( nvmx->msr_merged )
> > + {
> > + free_domheap_page(nvmx->msr_merged);
> > + nvmx->msr_merged = NULL;
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > void nvmx_domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
> > @@ -548,6 +563,37 @@ unsigned long *_shadow_io_bitmap(struct vcpu *v)
> > return nestedhvm_vcpu_iomap_get(port80, portED);
> > }
> >
> > +static void update_msrbitmap(struct vcpu *v)
> > +{
> > + struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
> > + struct vmx_msr_bitmap *msr_bitmap;
> > + unsigned int msr;
> > +
> > + ASSERT(__n2_exec_control(v) & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP);
>
> what about passing shadow_cntrl and also moving the outer
> condition check into this function? It is not good to assume
> that __n2_exec_control always has the same setting as the
> local variable shadow_cntrl.
>
> > +
> > + if ( !nvmx->msrbitmap )
> > + return;
> > +
> > + msr_bitmap = __map_domain_page(nvmx->msr_merged);
> > +
> > + bitmap_or(msr_bitmap->read_low, nvmx->msrbitmap->read_low,
> > + v->arch.hvm.vmx.msr_bitmap->read_low,
> > + sizeof(msr_bitmap->read_low) * 8);
> > + bitmap_or(msr_bitmap->read_high, nvmx->msrbitmap->read_high,
> > + v->arch.hvm.vmx.msr_bitmap->read_high,
> > + sizeof(msr_bitmap->read_high) * 8);
> > + bitmap_or(msr_bitmap->write_low, nvmx->msrbitmap->write_low,
> > + v->arch.hvm.vmx.msr_bitmap->write_low,
> > + sizeof(msr_bitmap->write_low) * 8);
> > + bitmap_or(msr_bitmap->write_high, nvmx->msrbitmap->write_high,
> > + v->arch.hvm.vmx.msr_bitmap->write_high,
> > + sizeof(msr_bitmap->write_high) * 8);
> > +
> > + unmap_domain_page(msr_bitmap);
> > +
> > + __vmwrite(MSR_BITMAP, page_to_maddr(nvmx->msr_merged));
> > +}
> > +
> > void nvmx_update_exec_control(struct vcpu *v, u32 host_cntrl)
> > {
> > u32 pio_cntrl = (CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_IO_BITMAP
> > @@ -558,10 +604,15 @@ void nvmx_update_exec_control(struct vcpu *v,
> > u32 host_cntrl)
> > shadow_cntrl = __n2_exec_control(v);
> > pio_cntrl &= shadow_cntrl;
> > /* Enforce the removed features */
> > - shadow_cntrl &= ~(CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP
> > - | CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_IO_BITMAP
> > + shadow_cntrl &= ~(CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_IO_BITMAP
> > | CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
> > - shadow_cntrl |= host_cntrl;
> > + /*
> > + * Do NOT enforce the MSR bitmap currently used by L1, as certain
> > hardware
> > + * virtualization features require specific MSR bitmap settings, but
> > + * without the guest also using these same features the bitmap could be
> > + * leaking through unwanted MSR accesses.
> > + */
> > + shadow_cntrl |= (host_cntrl & ~CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP);
>
> what about msr bitmap is disabled in host_cntrl? We'd better use AND-ed
> value from both shadow/host_cntrl for this bit, instead of assuming the
> policy of current Xen version which enables msr bitmap by default.
Ack, I've fixed all the above.
> > if ( pio_cntrl == CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING ) {
> > /* L1 VMM intercepts all I/O instructions */
> > shadow_cntrl |= CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING;
> > @@ -584,6 +635,9 @@ void nvmx_update_exec_control(struct vcpu *v, u32
> > host_cntrl)
> > __vmwrite(IO_BITMAP_B, virt_to_maddr(bitmap) + PAGE_SIZE);
> > }
> >
> > + if ( shadow_cntrl & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP )
> > + update_msrbitmap(v);
> > +
> > /* TODO: change L0 intr window to MTF or NMI window */
> > __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, shadow_cntrl);
> > }
> > @@ -1278,6 +1332,9 @@ static void load_vvmcs_host_state(struct vcpu *v)
> > hvm_set_tsc_offset(v, v->arch.hvm.cache_tsc_offset, 0);
> >
> > set_vvmcs(v, VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, 0);
> > +
> > + if ( v->arch.hvm.vmx.exec_control &
> > CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP )
> > + __vmwrite(MSR_BITMAP, virt_to_maddr(v-
> > >arch.hvm.vmx.msr_bitmap));
> > }
> >
> > static void sync_exception_state(struct vcpu *v)
> > diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h b/xen/include/asm-
> > x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
> > index 6b9c4ae0b2..c8d5600fdd 100644
> > --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.h
> > @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ struct nestedvmx {
> > */
> > paddr_t vmxon_region_pa;
> > void *iobitmap[2]; /* map (va) of L1 guest I/O
> > bitmap */
> > - void *msrbitmap; /* map (va) of L1 guest MSR bitmap
> > */
> > + struct vmx_msr_bitmap *msrbitmap; /* map (va) of L1 guest MSR
> > bitmap */
> > + struct page_info *msr_merged; /* merged L1 and L1 guest MSR
> > bitmap */
>
> L1 and L2
Well, L1 guest is L2 I think, but I can change to explicitly mention
L2 instead.
Thanks, Roger.
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |