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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/svm: Always intercept ICEBP


  • To: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2019 16:09:08 +0000
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On 26/11/2019 15:34, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 12:03:56PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> ICEBP isn't handled well by SVM.
>>
>> The VMexit state for a #DB-vectored TASK_SWITCH has %rip pointing to the
>> appropriate instruction boundary (fault or trap, as appropriate), except for
>> an ICEBP-induced #DB TASK_SWITCH, where %rip points at the ICEBP instruction
>> rather than after it.  As ICEBP isn't distinguished in the vectoring event
>> type, the state is ambiguous.
>>
>> To add to the confusion, an ICEBP which occurs due to Introspection
>> intercepting the instruction, or from x86_emulate() will have %rip updated as
>> a consequence of partial emulation required to inject an ICEBP event in the
>> first place.
>>
>> We could in principle spot the non-injected case in the TASK_SWITCH handler,
>> but this still results in complexity if the ICEBP instruction also has an
>> Instruction Breakpoint active on it (which genuinely has fault semantics).
>>
>> Unconditionally intercept ICEBP.  This does have a trap semantics for the
>> intercept, and allows us to move %rip forwards appropriately before the
>> TASK_SWITCH intercept is hit.  This makes the behaviour of #DB-vectored
>> switches consistent however the ICEBP #DB came about, and avoids special 
>> cases
>> in the TASK_SWITCH intercept.
>>
>> This in turn allows for the removal of the conditional
>> hvm_set_icebp_interception() logic used by the monitor subsystem, as ICEBP's
>> will now always be submitted for monitoring checks.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
>
> AFAICT this brings AMD implementation inline with Intel that also will
> unconditionally vmexit on icebp?

VT-x and SVM handle things quite differently.

VT-x has no instruction intercept for ICEBP, but the #DB intercept will
triggered by an ICEBP instruction.  ICEBP has its own event type
(Privileged Software Exception, which is an amusing name considering it
is an unprivleged instruction, bypasses privilege checks, and sets the
External bit in an error code).

SVM does have an instruction intercept for ICEBP, but the #DB from
ICEBP's don't trigger the normal #DB intercept.  However, secondary
#DB's generated by ICEBP's unintercepted #DB do trigger the #DB intercept.

For safety reasons we must intercept #DB to prevent CPU deadlocks.  This
means that ICEBP are in practice always intercepted on Intel due to
their #DB side effect, but they weren't intercepted on AMD, which is why
the monitor subsystem had a way of turning interception on.

So yes, the overall effect is that ICEBPs will now unconditionally
vmexit on both Intel and AMD, but underlying mechanism for why they
vmexit is still vendor-specific.

~Andrew

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