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[Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] xen/domain: Block more speculative out-of-bound accesses



c/s f8303458 restricted speculative access for do_vcpu_op(), but neglected its
compat counterpart, which is reachable by guests using the 32bit ABI.

Make an identical adjustment.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
CC: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/common/compat/domain.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/compat/domain.c b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
index 88bfdc8..39877b3 100644
--- a/xen/common/compat/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/compat/domain.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int compat_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, 
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) ar
     struct vcpu *v;
     int rc = 0;
 
-    if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[vcpuid]) == NULL )
+    if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpuid)) == NULL )
         return -ENOENT;
 
     switch ( cmd )
-- 
2.1.4


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