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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v7 1/9] xen/evtchn: block speculative out-of-bound accesses

>>> On 21.02.19 at 09:16, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> @@ -813,6 +817,7 @@ int set_global_virq_handler(struct domain *d, uint32_t 
> virq)
>      if (virq >= NR_VIRQS)
>          return -EINVAL;
> +
>      if (!virq_is_global(virq))
>          return -EINVAL;

Stray (but benign) change. Easy enough to take out while committing.
Without this:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Btw, it would have been nice if you had also dropped the somewhat
misleading SpectreV1 from the subject line tags of the series.


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