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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 2/9] x86/vioapic: block speculative out-of-bound accesses

>>> On 08.02.19 at 14:44, <nmanthey@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> When interacting with io apic, a guest can specify values that are used
> as index to structures, and whose values are not compared against
> upper bounds to prevent speculative out-of-bound accesses. This change
> prevents these speculative accesses.
> Furthermore, variables are initialized and the compiler is asked to not
> optimized these initializations, as the uninitialized, potentially guest
> controlled, variables might be used in a speculative out-of-bound access.

Uninitialized variables can't be guest controlled, not even potentially.
What we want to avoid here is speculation with uninitialized values
(or really stale data still on the stack from use by other code),
regardless of direct guest control.

> Out of the four initialized variables, two are potentially problematic,
> namely ones in the functions vioapic_irq_positive_edge and
> vioapic_get_trigger_mode.
> As the two problematic variables are both used in the common function
> gsi_vioapic, the mitigation is implemented there. As the access pattern
> of the currently non-guest-controlled functions might change in the
> future as well, the other variables are initialized as well.
> This commit is part of the SpectreV1+L1TF mitigation patch series.

Oh, I didn't pay attention in patch 1: You had meant to change this
wording to something including "speculative hardening" (throughout
the series).

> @@ -212,7 +220,15 @@ static void vioapic_write_redirent(
>      struct hvm_irq *hvm_irq = hvm_domain_irq(d);
>      union vioapic_redir_entry *pent, ent;
>      int unmasked = 0;
> -    unsigned int gsi = vioapic->base_gsi + idx;
> +    unsigned int gsi;
> +
> +    /* Callers of this function should make sure idx is bounded 
> appropriately */
> +    ASSERT(idx < vioapic->nr_pins);
> +
> +    /* Make sure no out-of-bound value for idx can be used */


I'm fine now with all the code changes here.


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