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[Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 2/3] libxl: don't reset device when it is accessible by the guest



When I destroyed a guest with 'xl destroy', I found the warning
in msi_set_mask_bit() in Xen was triggered. After adding "WARN_ON(1)"
to that place, I got the call trace below:

(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN)    [<ffff82d080281a6a>] msi.c#msi_set_mask_bit+0x1da/0x29b
(XEN)    [<ffff82d080282e78>] guest_mask_msi_irq+0x1c/0x1e
(XEN)    [<ffff82d08030ceb9>] vmsi.c#msixtbl_write+0x173/0x1d4
(XEN)    [<ffff82d08030cf30>] vmsi.c#_msixtbl_write+0x16/0x18
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802ffac4>] hvm_process_io_intercept+0x216/0x270
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802ffb45>] hvm_io_intercept+0x27/0x4c
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f0e86>] emulate.c#hvmemul_do_io+0x273/0x454
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f10a4>] emulate.c#hvmemul_do_io_buffer+0x3d/0x70
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f2343>] emulate.c#hvmemul_linear_mmio_access+0x35e/0x436
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f2640>] emulate.c#linear_write+0xdd/0x13b
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f3f25>] emulate.c#hvmemul_write+0xbd/0xf1
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802d51df>] x86_emulate+0x2249d/0x23c5c
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802d861f>] x86_emulate_wrapper+0x2b/0x5f
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f28aa>] emulate.c#_hvm_emulate_one+0x54/0x1b2
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f2a18>] hvm_emulate_one+0x10/0x12
(XEN)    [<ffff82d080300227>] hvm_emulate_one_insn+0x42/0x14a
(XEN)    [<ffff82d08030037e>] handle_mmio_with_translation+0x4f/0x51
(XEN)    [<ffff82d0802f803b>] hvm_hap_nested_page_fault+0x16c/0x6d8
(XEN)    [<ffff82d08032446a>] vmx_vmexit_handler+0x19b0/0x1f2e
(XEN)    [<ffff82d08032995a>] vmx_asm_vmexit_handler+0xfa/0x270

It seems to me that guest is trying to mask a msi while the memory decoding
of the device is disabled. Performing a device reset without proper method
to avoid guest's MSI-X operation would lead to this issue.

The fix is basic - detach pci device before resetting the device.

Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
index 87afa03..855fb71 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
@@ -1459,17 +1459,17 @@ skip1:
         fclose(f);
     }
 out:
-    /* don't do multiple resets while some functions are still passed through 
*/
-    if ( (pcidev->vdevfn & 0x7) == 0 ) {
-        libxl__device_pci_reset(gc, pcidev->domain, pcidev->bus, pcidev->dev, 
pcidev->func);
-    }
-
     if (!isstubdom) {
         rc = xc_deassign_device(ctx->xch, domid, pcidev_encode_bdf(pcidev));
         if (rc < 0 && (hvm || errno != ENOSYS))
             LOGED(ERROR, domainid, "xc_deassign_device failed");
     }
 
+    /* don't do multiple resets while some functions are still passed through 
*/
+    if ( (pcidev->vdevfn & 0x7) == 0 ) {
+        libxl__device_pci_reset(gc, pcidev->domain, pcidev->bus, pcidev->dev, 
pcidev->func);
+    }
+
     stubdomid = libxl_get_stubdom_id(ctx, domid);
     if (stubdomid != 0) {
         libxl_device_pci pcidev_s = *pcidev;
-- 
1.8.3.1


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