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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] x86/entry/64: Do not clear %rbx under Xen



On 07/21/2018 07:37 PM, M. Vefa Bicakci wrote:
On 07/21/2018 07:30 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Sat, Jul 21, 2018 at 4:19 PM, M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 07/21/2018 05:45 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

On Sat, Jul 21, 2018 at 12:49 PM, M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@xxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

Commit 3ac6d8c787b8 ("x86/entry/64: Clear registers for
exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface")
unintendedly
broke Xen PV virtual machines by clearing the %rbx register at the end of
xen_failsafe_callback before the latter jumps to error_exit.
error_exit expects the %rbx register to be a flag indicating whether
there should be a return to kernel mode.

This commit makes sure that the %rbx register is not cleared by
the PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro, when the macro in question is instantiated
by xen_failsafe_callback, to avoid the issue.


Seems like a genuine problem, but:

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index c7449f377a77..96e8ff34129e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
          addq    $0x30, %rsp
          UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
          pushq   $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
-       PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
+       PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS clear_rbx=0
          ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
          jmp     error_exit


The old code first set RBX to zero then, if frame pointers are on,
sets it to some special non-zero value, then crosses its fingers and
hopes for the best.  Your patched code just skips the zeroing part, so
RBX either contains the ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER result or is
uninitialized.

How about actually initializing rbx to something sensible like, say, 1?

Hello Andy,

Thank you for the review! Apparently, I have not done my homework fully.
I will test your suggestion and report back, most likely in a few hours.

I have been testing with the next/linux-next tree's master branch
(dated 20180720), and I noticed that ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER changes the
frame pointer (i.e., RBP) register, as opposed to the RBX register,
which the patch aims to avoid changing before jumping to error_exit.
It is possible that I am missing something though -- I am not sure about
the connection between the RBP and RBX registers.

Sorry, brain fart on my part.

No problem! :-)

The change introduced by commit 3ac6d8c787b8 is in the excerpt below. Would
it
be valid to state that the original code had the same issue that you
referred
to (i.e., leaving the RBX register uninitialized)?

Presumably.

I would propose a rather different fix:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux.git/commit/?h=x86/pti&id=bb3d76b50c3bc78b67d79cf90d328f38a435c793

Any chance you could test that and see if it fixes your problem?

Of course; I will report back with the result in a few hours.

Hello Andy,

I confirm that the commit at [1] resolves the issue in question as well.

To test, I first reverted my commit, applied your commit and verified that
the bug cannot be reproduced. Afterwards, I reverted your commit and
verified that the bug is reproducible.

I am not sure about the best way to document the bug I encountered in your
commit message, but in case you plan to have your commit merged, please
feel free to add a "Reported-and-tested-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@xxxxxxxxxx>"
tag to the commit message, possibly with a link to this e-mail thread.

Finally, as I had mentioned in my commit message, this bug exists in all
kernel versions 4.14 and greater, so it would be nice if you could carbon-copy
"stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" in the commit message as well.

Thank you,

Vefa

[1] 
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/linux.git/commit/?h=x86/pti&id=bb3d76b50c3bc78b67d79cf90d328f38a435c793


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