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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 13/13] x86/domctl: Implement XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy


  • To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 11:02:05 +0100
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  • Cc: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@xxxxxxxxxx>, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Daniel de Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 06 Jul 2018 10:02:21 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
  • Openpgp: preference=signencrypt

On 06/07/18 08:51, Jan Beulich wrote:
>
>>>>>> +    {
>>>>>> +        /* XXX - Figure out how to avoid a TOCTOU race here.  XLAT 
>>>>>> area? */
>>>>>> +        if ( (ret = x86_msr_copy_from_buffer(
>>>>>> +                  NULL, v->arch.msr, xdpc->msr_policy, xdpc->nr_msrs, 
>>>>>> NULL)) )
>>>>> Why can't you go from vCPU 0's v->arch.msr here, which is the copied-in
>>>>> (and sanitized) representation already? Also, is it really a good idea to
>>>>> assume all vCPU-s have the same policies?
>>>> There are multiple colliding issues which lead to this code, but as
>>>> several people have pointed out, its probably over the top.
>>>>
>>>> First, as to the same policy.  This hypercall can currently only be used
>>>> before the vcpu has started executing.
>>>>
>>>> As such, it is setting the init state of the MSRs from the guests point
>>>> of view, and there is exactly one MSR I'm aware of which has an init
>>>> value which depends on the core (that being APIC_BASE.BSP which can
>>>> trivially be handled in Xen).  All other MSRs have identical init state
>>>> AFAICT, and I don't want to create an interface which makes it easy to
>>>> accidentally end up with wrong values.
>>> So what about migration? There are certainly differing incoming values
>>> there. Of course there's the MSRs restore record, but no atomic sanity
>>> check between those and the policy here is possible.
>> Migration is still a problem.  This CPUID/MSR work is the next step on
>> the path to fixing the "state before policy" problem we've got when
>> restoring a guest.
>>
>> Once we have a working CPUID and R/O MSR configuration "blob" which the
>> toolstack can manipulate, we can (in Xen) require that the toolstack
>> provide the blob before memory and R/W register state.
> Hmm, you talk about r/o MSRs here only, but this then covers the
> domain policy object only when looking at what we currently have.
> Both MSRs in the vCPU policy object are r/w ones, and hence I'd
> like it to be at least clear what the interaction between the policy
> and other MSR restore is supposed to be in the end.
>
> This is in particular relevant wrt the derivation of data from vCPU 0
> here. With what you do currently, you already make the code
> dependent upon the MSRs record coming after the configuration
> done here, or else the cloning of vCPU 0 register values would
> clobber the intended (restored) ones.
>
>> When we get to that point, the toolstack shall call
>> DOMCTL_get_cpumsr_policy (modulo whatever plan I device to fix our R/W
>> MSR from the VCPU state problem) and place this ahead of the main
>> memory/register state in the migration stream.
> It is perhaps the case that r/w MSRs weren't actually meant to go
> into the policy structures?
>
>> The receiving side will either feed the blob back to Xen, or fabricate
>> the policy out of thin air at this point.  The current behaviour is to
>> fabricate a policy out of thin air after all migration stream is
>> complete, but before unpausing the domain.
> I.e., as mentioned above, you clobber the values coming from the
> CPU_MSR record. I don't think this can be the way to go, not even
> temporarily.

Jan and I have discussed this on IRC and have a plan.

The only reason msr_vcpu_policy was included in
XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy was for SGX_LC, and because SGX_LC
introduces some MSRs which may want to be RO domain-wide settings or RW
per-vcpu settings.  We can fix this by having an SGX_LC set in both
domain and vcpu blocks, as which block to use is determined by a
different RO setting.

As a result, we can retain the current separation of RO vs RW MSRs and
limit XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy to just the domain MSRs.  This
simplifies things massively, and still allows SGX_LC to coexist in a
fairly clean manner.

~Andrew

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