[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH V4] x86/altp2m: Fix crash with INVALID_ALTP2M EPTP index
>>> On 27.06.18 at 17:25, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 06/27/2018 06:04 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 27.06.18 at 15:12, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> xc_altp2m_set_vcpu_enable_notify() ends up calling >>> altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve(), which sets the >>> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS bit on >>> vmx_secondary_exec_control. A subsequent call to >>> xc_altp2m_set_domain_state(..., false) (i.e. disabling altp2m >>> for the domain) ends up calling altp2m_vcpu_destroy(), which >>> calls (in this order) altp2m_vcpu_reset() (which sets the >>> current EPTP index to INVALID_ALTP2M), altp2m_vcpu_update_p2m() >>> (which __vmwrite()s EPTP_INDEX as INVALID_ALTP2M if >>> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS is set), and >>> altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve() (which finally clears >>> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS). >> >> I continue to consider this paragraph unreadable, but perhaps it's >> just me. The rest of the description looks reasonable to me now. > > If you (or anyone else) have something specific in mind I'd be happy to > change it to that, otherwise I can also try again (the only concern is > that I might unwantedly continue to be unable to guess correctly at the > desired balance between technical clarity (detail) and general readability). > > Is "A VM entry handler executed immediately after enabling #VE might > find a stale __vmsave()d EPTP_INDEX, stored by calling > altp2m_vcpu_destroy() when SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS had > been set by altp2m_vcpu_update_vmfunc_ve()." a better first paragraph > perhaps? To me personally - yes, very much. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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