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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [Patch v3 2/2] x86/microcode: Synchronize late microcode loading
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 03:21:14PM +0800, Chao Gao wrote:
>On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 07:46:48AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 16.05.18 at 15:25, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 16/05/18 14:10, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> +static int do_microcode_update(void *_info)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + struct microcode_info *info = _info;
>>>>> + unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + ret = wait_for_cpus(&info->cpu_in, MICROCODE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT);
>>>>> + if ( ret )
>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Logical threads which set the first bit in cpu_sibling_mask can do
>>>>> + * the update. Other sibling threads just await the completion of
>>>>> + * microcode update.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if ( !cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(
>>>>> + cpumask_first(per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu)),
>>>>> &info->cpus) )
>>>>> + ret = microcode_update_cpu(info->buffer, info->buffer_size);
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Increase the wait timeout to a safe value here since we're
>>>>> serializing
>>>>> + * the microcode update and that could take a while on a large
>>>>> number of
>>>>> + * CPUs. And that is fine as the *actual* timeout will be determined
>>>>> by
>>>>> + * the last CPU finished updating and thus cut short
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if ( wait_for_cpus(&info->cpu_out, MICROCODE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT *
>>>>> + nr_phys_cpus) )
>>>> I remain unconvinced that this is a safe thing to do on a huge system with
>>>> guests running (even Dom0 alone would seem risky enough). I continue to
>
>I think there are other operations may also endanger the security, stability
>of the whole system. We offer them with caveats. Same here, three
>different methods can be used to update microcode; the late update isn't
>perfect at this moment. At least, we provide a more reliable method to update
>microcode at runtime on systems with no so many cores. And for a huge
>system, admins can assess the risk and choose the most suitable method.
>They can completely avoid doing live updates and mandate a reboot and do
>it early since that's the most dependable method.
>
>>>> hope for comments from others, in particular Andrew, here. At the very
>>>> least I think you should taint the hypervisor when making it here.
>>>
>>> I see nothing in this patch which prevents a deadlock against the time
>>> calibration rendezvous. It think its fine to pause the time calibration
>>> rendezvous while performing this update.
>>
>>If there's a problem here, wouldn't that be a general one with
>>stop_machine()?
>
>I agree with Jan. It shouldn't be specific to the stop_machine() here.
>Anyhow, I will look into the potential deadlock you mentioned.
>
>>
>>> Also, what is the purpose of serialising the updates while all pcpus are
>>> in rendezvous?
>
>microcode_mutex which prevents doing the updates in parallel is not
>introduced by this patch. At present, We want to keep this patch and the
>update process simple. Could we just make it work first and try to work
>out some optimizations later?
Hi Jan & Andrew,
Do you think it is acceptable that we just follow linux kernel at present
and work out optimizations later?
Thanks
Chao
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