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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/1] drm/xen-zcopy: Add Xen zero-copy helper DRM driver



On 04/18/2018 08:01 PM, Dongwon Kim wrote:
On Wed, Apr 18, 2018 at 09:38:39AM +0300, Oleksandr Andrushchenko wrote:
On 04/17/2018 11:57 PM, Dongwon Kim wrote:
On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 09:59:28AM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 12:29:05PM -0700, Dongwon Kim wrote:
Yeah, I definitely agree on the idea of expanding the use case to the
general domain where dmabuf sharing is used. However, what you are
targetting with proposed changes is identical to the core design of
hyper_dmabuf.

On top of this basic functionalities, hyper_dmabuf has driver level
inter-domain communication, that is needed for dma-buf remote tracking
(no fence forwarding though), event triggering and event handling, extra
meta data exchange and hyper_dmabuf_id that represents grefs
(grefs are shared implicitly on driver level)
This really isn't a positive design aspect of hyperdmabuf imo. The core
code in xen-zcopy (ignoring the ioctl side, which will be cleaned up) is
very simple & clean.

If there's a clear need later on we can extend that. But for now xen-zcopy
seems to cover the basic use-case needs, so gets the job done.

Also it is designed with frontend (common core framework) + backend
(hyper visor specific comm and memory sharing) structure for portability.
We just can't limit this feature to Xen because we want to use the same
uapis not only for Xen but also other applicable hypervisor, like ACORN.
See the discussion around udmabuf and the needs for kvm. I think trying to
make an ioctl/uapi that works for multiple hypervisors is misguided - it
likely won't work.

On top of that the 2nd hypervisor you're aiming to support is ACRN. That's
not even upstream yet, nor have I seen any patches proposing to land linux
support for ACRN. Since it's not upstream, it doesn't really matter for
upstream consideration. I'm doubting that ACRN will use the same grant
references as xen, so the same uapi won't work on ACRN as on Xen anyway.
Yeah, ACRN doesn't have grant-table. Only Xen supports it. But that is why
hyper_dmabuf has been architectured with the concept of backend.
If you look at the structure of backend, you will find that
backend is just a set of standard function calls as shown here:

struct hyper_dmabuf_bknd_ops {
         /* backend initialization routine (optional) */
         int (*init)(void);

         /* backend cleanup routine (optional) */
         int (*cleanup)(void);

         /* retreiving id of current virtual machine */
         int (*get_vm_id)(void);

         /* get pages shared via hypervisor-specific method */
         int (*share_pages)(struct page **pages, int vm_id,
                            int nents, void **refs_info);

         /* make shared pages unshared via hypervisor specific method */
         int (*unshare_pages)(void **refs_info, int nents);

         /* map remotely shared pages on importer's side via
          * hypervisor-specific method
          */
         struct page ** (*map_shared_pages)(unsigned long ref, int vm_id,
                                            int nents, void **refs_info);

         /* unmap and free shared pages on importer's side via
          * hypervisor-specific method
          */
         int (*unmap_shared_pages)(void **refs_info, int nents);

         /* initialize communication environment */
         int (*init_comm_env)(void);

         void (*destroy_comm)(void);

         /* upstream ch setup (receiving and responding) */
         int (*init_rx_ch)(int vm_id);

         /* downstream ch setup (transmitting and parsing responses) */
         int (*init_tx_ch)(int vm_id);

         int (*send_req)(int vm_id, struct hyper_dmabuf_req *req, int wait);
};

All of these can be mapped with any hypervisor specific implementation.
We designed backend implementation for Xen using grant-table, Xen event
and ring buffer communication. For ACRN, we have another backend using Virt-IO
for both memory sharing and communication.

We tried to define this structure of backend to make it general enough (or
it can be even modified or extended to support more cases.) so that it can
fit to other hypervisor cases. Only requirements/expectation on the hypervisor
are page-level memory sharing and inter-domain communication, which I think
are standard features of modern hypervisor.

And please review common UAPIs that hyper_dmabuf and xen-zcopy supports. They
are very general. One is getting FD (dmabuf) and get those shared. The other
is generating dmabuf from global handle (secure handle hiding gref behind it).
On top of this, hyper_dmabuf has "unshare" and "query" which are also useful
for any cases.

So I don't know why we wouldn't want to try to make these standard in most of
hypervisor cases instead of limiting it to certain hypervisor like Xen.
Frontend-backend structre is optimal for this I think.

So I am wondering we can start with this hyper_dmabuf then modify it for
your use-case if needed and polish and fix any glitches if we want to
to use this for all general dma-buf usecases.
Imo xen-zcopy is a much more reasonable starting point for upstream, which
can then be extended (if really proven to be necessary).

Also, I still have one unresolved question regarding the export/import flow
in both of hyper_dmabuf and xen-zcopy.

@danvet: Would this flow (guest1->import existing dmabuf->share underlying
pages->guest2->map shared pages->create/export dmabuf) be acceptable now?
I think if you just look at the pages, and make sure you handle the
sg_page == NULL case it's ok-ish. It's not great, but mostly it should
work. The real trouble with hyperdmabuf was the forwarding of all these
calls, instead of just passing around a list of grant references.
I talked to danvet about this litte bit.

I think there was some misunderstanding on this "forwarding". Exporting
and importing flow in hyper_dmabuf are basically same as xen-zcopy's. I think
what made confusion was that importing domain notifies exporting domain when
there are dmabuf operations (like attach, mapping, detach and release) so that
exporting domain can track the usage of dmabuf on the importing domain.

I designed this for some basic tracking. We may not need to notify for every
different activity but if none of them is there, exporting domain can't
determine if it is ok to unshare the buffer or the originator (like i915)
can free the object even if it's being accessed in importing domain.

Anyway I really hope we can have enough discussion and resolve all concerns
before nailing it down.
Let me explain how this works in case of para-virtual display
use-case with xen-zcopy.

1. There are 4 components in the system:
   - displif protocol [1]
   - xen-front - para-virtual DRM driver running in DomU (Guest) VM
   - backend - user-space application running in Dom0
   - xen-zcopy - DRM (as of now) helper driver running in Dom0

2. All the communication between domains happens between xen-front and the
backend, so it is possible to implement para-virtual display use-case
without xen-zcopy at all (this is why it is a helper driver), but in this
case
memory copying occurs (this is out of scope for this discussion).

3. To better understand security issues let's see what use-cases we have:

3.1 xen-front exports its dma-buf (dumb) to the backend

In this case there are no security issues at all as Dom0 (backend side)
will use DomU's pages (xen-front side) and Dom0 is a trusted domain, so
we assume it won't hurt DomU. Even if DomU dies nothing bad happens to Dom0.
If DomU misbehaves it can only write to its own pages shared with Dom0, but
still
cannot go beyond that, e.g. it can't access Dom0's memory.

3.2 Backend exports dma-buf to xen-front

In this case Dom0 pages are shared with DomU. As before, DomU can only write
to these pages, not any other page from Dom0, so it can be still considered
safe.
But, the following must be considered (highlighted in xen-front's Kernel
documentation):
  - If guest domain dies then pages/grants received from the backend cannot
    be claimed back - think of it as memory lost to Dom0 (won't be used for
any
    other guest)
  - Misbehaving guest may send too many requests to the backend exhausting
    its grant references and memory (consider this from security POV). As the
    backend runs in the trusted domain we also assume that it is trusted as
well,
    e.g. must take measures to prevent DDoS attacks.

There is another security issue that this driver itself can cause. Using the
grant-reference as is is not very safe because it's easy to guess (counting
number probably) and any attackers running on the same importing domain can
use these references to map shared pages and access the data. This is why we
implemented "hyper_dmabuf_id" that contains 96 bit random number to make it
almost impossible to guess.
Yes, there is something to think about in general, not related
to dma-buf/zcopy. This is a question to Xen community what they
see as the right approach here.
  All grant references for pages are shared in the
driver level. This is another reason for having inter-VM comm.

4. xen-front/backend/xen-zcopy synchronization

4.1. As I already said in 2) all the inter VM communication happens between
xen-front and the backend, xen-zcopy is NOT involved in that.
Yeah, understood but this is also my point. Both hyper_dmabuf and xen-zcopy
is a driver that expands dmabuf sharing to inter-VM level. Then shouldn't this
driver itself provide some way to synchronize between two VMs?
No, because xen-zcopy is a *helper* driver, not more.
  I think the
assumption behind this is that Xen PV display interface and backend (running
on the userspace) are used together with xen-zcopy
Backend may use xen-zcopy or may not - it depends if you need
zero copy or not, e.g. it is not a must for the backend
but what if an user space
just want to use xen-zcopy separately? Since it exposes ioctls, this is
possible unless you add some dependency configuration there.
It is possible, any backend (user-space application) can use xen-zcopy
Even more, one can extend it to provide kernel side API

When xen-front wants to destroy a display buffer (dumb/dma-buf) it issues a
XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_DESTROY command (opposite to XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_CREATE).
This call is synchronous, so xen-front expects that backend does free the
buffer pages on return.
Does it mean importing domain (dom0 assuming we do domU -> dom0 dmabuf
exporting) makes a destory request to the exporting VM?
No, the requester is always DomU, so "destroy buffer" request
will always come from DomU
  But isn't it
the domU to make such decision since it's the owner of buffer.
See above

And what about the other way around? For example, what happens if the
originator of buffer (like i915) decides to free the object behind dmabuf?
For that reason there is ref-counting for dma-buf, e.g.
if i915 decides to free then the backend (in my case) still holds
the buffer, thus not allowing it do disappear. Basically, this is
the backend which creates dma-buf from refs and owns it.
Would i915 or exporting side of xen-zcopy know whether dom0 currently
uses the dmabuf or not?
Why do you need this to know (probably I don't understand the use-case).
I could be obvious here, but if ref-count of the dma-buf is not zero
it is still exists and used?

And again, I think this tracking should be handled in the driver itself
implicitly without any userspace involvement if we want to this dmabuf
sharing exist as a generic feature.
Why not allow dma-buf Linux framework do that for you?

4.2. Backend, on XENDISPL_OP_DBUF_DESTROY:
   - closes all dumb handles/fd's of the buffer according to [3]
   - issues DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE IOCTL to xen-zcopy to make
sure
     the buffer is freed (think of it as it waits for dma-buf->release
callback)
   - replies to xen-front that the buffer can be destroyed.
This way deletion of the buffer happens synchronously on both Dom0 and DomU
sides. In case if DRM_IOCTL_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE returns with time-out
error
(BTW, wait time is a parameter of this IOCTL), Xen will defer grant
reference
removal and will retry later until those are free.

Hope this helps understand how buffers are synchronously deleted in case
of xen-zcopy with a single protocol command.

I think the above logic can also be re-used by the hyper-dmabuf driver with
some additional work:

1. xen-zcopy can be split into 2 parts and extend:
1.1. Xen gntdev driver [4], [5] to allow creating dma-buf from grefs and
vise versa,
implement "wait" ioctl (wait for dma-buf->release): currently these are
DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_FROM_REFS, DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_TO_REFS and
DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE
1.2. Xen balloon driver [6] to allow allocating contiguous buffers (not
needed
by current hyper-dmabuf, but is a must for xen-zcopy use-cases)
Not sure how to match our use case to xen-zcopy's case but we don't do alloc
/free all the time.
We also don't
  Also, dom0 won't make any freeing request to domU since it
doesn't own the buffer. It only follows dmabuf protocol as such attach/detach
/release,
Similar here
  which are tracked by domU (exporting VM). And for destruction of
sharing, we have separate IOCTL for that, which revoke grant references "IF"
there is no drivers attached to the dmabuf in dom0. Otherwise, it schedules
destruction of sharing until it gets final dmabuf release message from dom0.
We block instead with 3sec timeout + some other logic
(out of context now)

Also, in our usecase, (although we didn't intend to do so) it ends up using
3~4 buffers repeately.
2-3 in our use-cases
This is because DRM in domU (that renders) doesn't
allocate more object for EGL image since there is always free objects used
before exist in the list. And we actually don't do full-path exporting
(extracting pages -> grant-references -> get those shared) all the time.
If the same dmabuf is exported already, we just update private message then
notifies dom0 (reason for hash tables for keeping exported and importer
dmabufs).
In my case these 2-3 buffers are allocated at start and not freed
until the end - these are used as frame buffers which are constantly
flipped. So, in my case there is no much profit in trying to cache
which adds unneeded complexity (in my use-case, of course).
If those 3-4 buffers you allocate are the only buffers used you may
also try going without caching, but this depends on your use-case

2. Then hyper-dmabuf uses Xen gntdev driver for Xen specific dma-buf
alloc/free/wait

3. hyper-dmabuf uses its own protocol between VMs to communicate buffer
creation/deletion and whatever else is needed (fences?).

To Xen community: please think of dma-buf here as of a buffer representation
mechanism,
e.g. at the end of the day it's just a set of pages.

Thank you,
Oleksandr
-Daniel

Regards,
DW
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 05:33:46PM +0300, Oleksandr Andrushchenko wrote:
Hello, all!

After discussing xen-zcopy and hyper-dmabuf [1] approaches

it seems that xen-zcopy can be made not depend on DRM core any more

and be dma-buf centric (which it in fact is).

The DRM code was mostly there for dma-buf's FD import/export

with DRM PRIME UAPI and with DRM use-cases in mind, but it comes out that if

the proposed 2 IOCTLs (DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_FROM_REFS and
DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_TO_REFS)

are extended to also provide a file descriptor of the corresponding dma-buf,
then

PRIME stuff in the driver is not needed anymore.

That being said, xen-zcopy can safely be detached from DRM and moved from

drivers/gpu/drm/xen into drivers/xen/dma-buf-backend(?).

This driver then becomes a universal way to turn any shared buffer between
Dom0/DomD

and DomU(s) into a dma-buf, e.g. one can create a dma-buf from any grant
references

or represent a dma-buf as grant-references for export.

This way the driver can be used not only for DRM use-cases, but also for
other

use-cases which may require zero copying between domains.

For example, the use-cases we are about to work in the nearest future will
use

V4L, e.g. we plan to support cameras, codecs etc. and all these will benefit

>from zero copying much. Potentially, even block/net devices may benefit,
but this needs some evaluation.


I would love to hear comments for authors of the hyper-dmabuf

and Xen community, as well as DRI-Devel and other interested parties.


Thank you,

Oleksandr


On 03/29/2018 04:19 PM, Oleksandr Andrushchenko wrote:
From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@xxxxxxxx>

Hello!

When using Xen PV DRM frontend driver then on backend side one will need
to do copying of display buffers' contents (filled by the
frontend's user-space) into buffers allocated at the backend side.
Taking into account the size of display buffers and frames per seconds
it may result in unneeded huge data bus occupation and performance loss.

This helper driver allows implementing zero-copying use-cases
when using Xen para-virtualized frontend display driver by
implementing a DRM/KMS helper driver running on backend's side.
It utilizes PRIME buffers API to share frontend's buffers with
physical device drivers on backend's side:

  - a dumb buffer created on backend's side can be shared
    with the Xen PV frontend driver, so it directly writes
    into backend's domain memory (into the buffer exported from
    DRM/KMS driver of a physical display device)
  - a dumb buffer allocated by the frontend can be imported
    into physical device DRM/KMS driver, thus allowing to
    achieve no copying as well

For that reason number of IOCTLs are introduced:
  -  DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_FROM_REFS
     This will create a DRM dumb buffer from grant references provided
     by the frontend
  - DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_TO_REFS
    This will grant references to a dumb/display buffer's memory provided
    by the backend
  - DRM_XEN_ZCOPY_DUMB_WAIT_FREE
    This will block until the dumb buffer with the wait handle provided
    be freed

With this helper driver I was able to drop CPU usage from 17% to 3%
on Renesas R-Car M3 board.

This was tested with Renesas' Wayland-KMS and backend running as DRM master.

Thank you,
Oleksandr

Oleksandr Andrushchenko (1):
   drm/xen-zcopy: Add Xen zero-copy helper DRM driver

  Documentation/gpu/drivers.rst               |   1 +
  Documentation/gpu/xen-zcopy.rst             |  32 +
  drivers/gpu/drm/xen/Kconfig                 |  25 +
  drivers/gpu/drm/xen/Makefile                |   5 +
  drivers/gpu/drm/xen/xen_drm_zcopy.c         | 880 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  drivers/gpu/drm/xen/xen_drm_zcopy_balloon.c | 154 +++++
  drivers/gpu/drm/xen/xen_drm_zcopy_balloon.h |  38 ++
  include/uapi/drm/xen_zcopy_drm.h            | 129 ++++
  8 files changed, 1264 insertions(+)
  create mode 100644 Documentation/gpu/xen-zcopy.rst
  create mode 100644 drivers/gpu/drm/xen/xen_drm_zcopy.c
  create mode 100644 drivers/gpu/drm/xen/xen_drm_zcopy_balloon.c
  create mode 100644 drivers/gpu/drm/xen/xen_drm_zcopy_balloon.h
  create mode 100644 include/uapi/drm/xen_zcopy_drm.h

[1]
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-02/msg01202.html
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--
Daniel Vetter
Software Engineer, Intel Corporation
http://blog.ffwll.ch
[1] 
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc1/source/include/xen/interface/io/displif.h
[2] 
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc1/source/include/xen/interface/io/displif.h#L539
[3] 
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc1/source/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_prime.c#L39
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc1/source/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
[5]
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc1/source/include/uapi/xen/gntdev.h
[6] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.17-rc1/source/drivers/xen/balloon.c


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