Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 4/7] xen/arm32: Add skeleton to harden branch predictor aliasing attacks

[Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, 31 Jan 2018, Julien Grall wrote:
> From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Aliasing attacked against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to
> redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge
> information from one context to another.
> 
> This patch adds initiatial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option
> to enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks
> for CPUs that are affected.
> 
> Most of mitigations will have to be applied when entering to the
> hypervisor from the guest context.
> 
> Because the attack is against branch predictor, it is not possible to
> safely use branch instruction before the mitigation is applied.
> Therefore this has to be done in the vector entry before jump to the
> helper handling a given exception.
> 
> However, on arm32, each vector contain a single instruction. This means
> that the hardened vector tables may rely on the state of registers that
> does not hold when in the hypervisor (e.g SP is 8 bytes aligned).
> Therefore hypervisor code running with guest vectors table should be
> minimized and always have IRQs and SErrors masked to reduce the risk to
> use them.
> 
> This patch provides an infrastructure to switch vector tables before
> entering to the guest and when leaving it.
> 
> Note that alternative could have been used, but older Xen (4.8 or
> earlier) doesn't have support. So avoid using alternative to ease
> backporting.
> 
> This is part of XSA-254.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>

Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>


> ---
>     Changes in v2:
>         - Clarify the commit message
> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/Kconfig       |  3 +++
>  xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c   | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig
> index 06fd85cc77..2782ee6589 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/Kconfig
> @@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
>  config ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
>      def_bool y if ARM_64 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
>  
> +config ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +    def_bool y if ARM_32 && HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +
>  source "common/Kconfig"
>  
>  source "drivers/Kconfig"
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
> index 64876c1184..828e52c25c 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
> @@ -34,6 +34,20 @@
>          blne save_guest_regs
>  
>  save_guest_regs:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +        /*
> +         * Restore vectors table to the default as it may have been
> +         * changed when returning to the guest (see
> +         * return_to_hypervisor). We need to do that early (e.g before
> +         * any interrupts are unmasked) because hardened vectors requires
> +         * SP to be 8 bytes aligned. This does not hold when running in
> +         * the hypervisor.
> +         */
> +        ldr r1, =hyp_traps_vector
> +        mcr p15, 4, r1, c12, c0, 0
> +        isb
> +#endif
> +
>          ldr r11, =0xffffffff  /* Clobber SP which is only valid for 
> hypervisor frames. */
>          str r11, [sp, #UREGS_sp]
>          SAVE_ONE_BANKED(SP_usr)
> @@ -179,12 +193,37 @@ return_to_guest:
>          RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(R11_fiq); RESTORE_ONE_BANKED(R12_fiq);
>          /* Fall thru */
>  return_to_hypervisor:
> -        cpsid i
> +        cpsid ai
>          ldr lr, [sp, #UREGS_lr]
>          ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_pc]
>          msr ELR_hyp, r11
>          ldr r11, [sp, #UREGS_cpsr]
>          msr SPSR_hyp, r11
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +        /*
> +         * Hardening branch predictor may require to setup a different
> +         * vector tables before returning to the guests. Those vectors
> +         * may rely on the state of registers that does not hold when
> +         * running in the hypervisor (e.g SP is 8 bytes aligned). So setup
> +         * HVBAR very late.
> +         *
> +         * Default vectors table will be restored on exit (see
> +         * save_guest_regs).
> +         */
> +        mov r9, #0                      /* vector tables = NULL */
> +        /*
> +         * Load vector tables pointer from the per-cpu bp_harden_vecs
> +         * when returning to the guest only.
> +         */
> +        and r11, #PSR_MODE_MASK
> +        cmp r11, #PSR_MODE_HYP
> +        ldrne r11, =per_cpu__bp_harden_vecs
> +        mrcne p15, 4, r10, c13, c0, 2   /* r10 = per-cpu offset (HTPIDR) */
> +        addne r11, r11, r10             /* r11 = offset of the vector tables 
> */
> +        ldrne r9, [r11]                 /* r9  = vector tables */
> +        cmp r9, #0                      /* Only update HVBAR when the vector 
> */
> +        mcrne p15, 4, r9, c12, c0, 0    /* tables is not NULL. */
> +#endif
>          pop {r0-r12}
>          add sp, #(UREGS_SP_usr - UREGS_sp); /* SP, LR, SPSR, PC */
>          clrex
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c
> index f1ea7f3c5b..0a138fa735 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c
> @@ -170,6 +170,36 @@ static int enable_psci_bp_hardening(void *data)
>  
>  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
>  
> +/* Hardening Branch predictor code for Arm32 */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +
> +/*
> + * Per-CPU vector tables to use when returning to the guests. They will
> + * only be used on platform requiring to harden the branch predictor.
> + */
> +DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, bp_harden_vecs);
> +
> +extern char hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv[];
> +
> +static void __maybe_unused
> +install_bp_hardening_vecs(const struct arm_cpu_capabilities *entry,
> +                          const char *hyp_vecs, const char *desc)
> +{
> +    /*
> +     * Enable callbacks are called on every CPU based on the
> +     * capabilities. So double-check whether the CPU matches the
> +     * entry.
> +     */
> +    if ( !entry->matches(entry) )
> +        return;
> +
> +    printk(XENLOG_INFO "CPU%u will %s on guest exit\n",
> +           smp_processor_id(), desc);
> +    this_cpu(bp_harden_vecs) = hyp_vecs;
> +}
> +
> +#endif
> +
>  #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max)     \
>      .matches = is_affected_midr_range,  \
>      .midr_model = model,                \
> -- 
> 2.11.0
> 

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel