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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 5/7] xen/arm32: Invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex A17 and 12



On Fri, 19 Jan 2018, Julien Grall wrote:
> In order to avoid aliasing attackes agains the branch predictor, let's
> invalidate the BTB on guest exist. This is made complicated by the fact
> that we cannot take a branch invalidating the BTB.
> 
> This is based on the first version posrted by Marc Zyngier on Linux-arm
> mailing list (see [1]).
> 
> This is part of XSA-254.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> [1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/arm-kernel/msg627032.html
> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S | 55 
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c   | 19 ++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
> index 54a1733f87..c6ec0aa399 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm32/entry.S
> @@ -160,6 +160,61 @@ GLOBAL(hyp_traps_vector)
>          b trap_irq                      /* 0x18 - IRQ */
>          b trap_fiq                      /* 0x1c - FIQ */
>  
> +        .align 5
> +GLOBAL(hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv)
> +        /*
> +         * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
> +         * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
> +         */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* Reset            7 */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* Undef            6 */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* Hypervisor Call  5 */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* Prefetch abort   4 */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* Data abort       3 */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* Hypervisor       2 */
> +        add sp, sp, #1                  /* IRQ              1 */
> +        nop                             /* FIQ              0 */

Clever! Things that you don't read every day :-)


> +        mcr  p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6       /* BPIALL */
> +        isb
> +
> +        /*
> +         * As we cannot use any temporary registers and cannot
> +         * clobber SP, we can decode the exception entry using
> +         * an unrolled binary search.
> +         */
> +        tst sp, #4
> +        bne 1f
> +
> +        tst sp, #2
> +        bne 3f
> +
> +        tst sp, #1
> +        bic sp, sp, #0x7
> +        bne trap_irq
> +        b   trap_fiq

I might be confused, but this is the case where sp == 0x7, right?
Shouldn't we have b trap_reset here?

Similarly the branch just above corresponds to 0x6, which should be
bne trap_undefined_instruction.

What am I getting wrong?



> +1:
> +        tst sp, #2
> +        bne 2f
> +
> +        tst sp, #1
> +        bic sp, sp, #0x7
> +        bne trap_hypervisor_call
> +        b   trap_prefetch_abort
> +
> +2:
> +        tst sp, #1
> +        bic sp, sp, #0x7
> +        bne trap_reset
> +        b   trap_undefined_instruction
> +
> +3:
> +        tst sp, #1
> +        bic sp, sp, #0x7
> +        bne trap_data_abort
> +        b   trap_guest_sync
> +
>  DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(reset)
>  DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(undefined_instruction)
>  DEFINE_TRAP_ENTRY(hypervisor_call)
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c
> index 0a138fa735..c79e6d65d3 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/cpuerrata.c
> @@ -198,6 +198,13 @@ install_bp_hardening_vecs(const struct 
> arm_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>      this_cpu(bp_harden_vecs) = hyp_vecs;
>  }
>  
> +static int enable_bp_inv_hardening(void *data)
> +{
> +    install_bp_hardening_vecs(data, hyp_traps_vector_bp_inv,
> +                              "execute BPIALL");
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>  #endif
>  
>  #define MIDR_RANGE(model, min, max)     \
> @@ -284,6 +291,18 @@ static const struct arm_cpu_capabilities arm_errata[] = {
>          .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening,
>      },
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM32_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
> +    {
> +        .capability = ARM_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
> +        MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A12),
> +        .enable = enable_bp_inv_hardening,
> +    },
> +    {
> +        .capability = ARM_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
> +        MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A17),
> +        .enable = enable_bp_inv_hardening,
> +    },
> +#endif
>      {},
>  };
>  
> -- 
> 2.11.0
> 

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