[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot

On 12 January 2018 at 11:24, Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hi Ard,
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 12:51:07PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On 9 January 2018 at 14:22, Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > Hi,
>> >
>> > Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
>> > may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform.
>> Hi Daniel,
>> I must say, I am not too thrilled with the approach you have chosen
>> here. #including .c files in other .c files, and using #defines to
>> override C functions or other stub functionality is rather fragile. In
> TBH I do not like it too. Sadly I have not find a better solution for
> that. I wish to avoid code duplication as much as possible because
> otherwise it will fall out of sync sooner or later (usually sooner).
> Similar thing happened in different part of Xen EFI code a few months ago.
>> particular, it means we have to start caring about not breaking
>> Xen/x86 code when making modifications to the EFI stub, and that code
>> is already difficult enough to maintain, given that it is shared
>> between ARM, arm64 and x86, and runs either from the decompressor or
>> the kernel proper (arm64) but in the context of the UEFI firmware.
> I understand that.
>> None of the stub code currently runs in ordinary kernel context.
> Yep.
>> So please, could you try to find another way to do this?
> I am happy to improve the situation, however, I am afraid that it is
> difficult here. Stub and kernel proper are separate entities and simple
> linking does not work. So, It seems to me that only play with includes
> will allow us to not duplicate the code. However, if you have a better
> idea I am happy to implement it.

Actually, there is another reason why it does not make sense to reuse that code.

This code

* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
* honor that.
size = sizeof(moksbstate);
status = get_efi_var(L"MokSBState", &shim_guid,
     &attr, &size, &moksbstate);

/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
    goto secure_boot_enabled;
if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
    return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;

will always fail after exiting boot services, so it makes no sense to
call it from xen_efi_init().

So I suggest you just clone the function and only keep the pieces that
make sense for Xen.


Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.