[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 0/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot
On 12 January 2018 at 11:24, Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Hi Ard, > > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 12:51:07PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> On 9 January 2018 at 14:22, Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > Hi, >> > >> > Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel >> > may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform. >> >> Hi Daniel, >> >> I must say, I am not too thrilled with the approach you have chosen >> here. #including .c files in other .c files, and using #defines to >> override C functions or other stub functionality is rather fragile. In > > TBH I do not like it too. Sadly I have not find a better solution for > that. I wish to avoid code duplication as much as possible because > otherwise it will fall out of sync sooner or later (usually sooner). > Similar thing happened in different part of Xen EFI code a few months ago. > >> particular, it means we have to start caring about not breaking >> Xen/x86 code when making modifications to the EFI stub, and that code >> is already difficult enough to maintain, given that it is shared >> between ARM, arm64 and x86, and runs either from the decompressor or >> the kernel proper (arm64) but in the context of the UEFI firmware. > > I understand that. > >> None of the stub code currently runs in ordinary kernel context. > > Yep. > >> So please, could you try to find another way to do this? > > I am happy to improve the situation, however, I am afraid that it is > difficult here. Stub and kernel proper are separate entities and simple > linking does not work. So, It seems to me that only play with includes > will allow us to not duplicate the code. However, if you have a better > idea I am happy to implement it. > Actually, there is another reason why it does not make sense to reuse that code. This code /* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well * honor that. */ size = sizeof(moksbstate); status = get_efi_var(L"MokSBState", &shim_guid, &attr, &size, &moksbstate); /* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) goto secure_boot_enabled; if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1) return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; will always fail after exiting boot services, so it makes no sense to call it from xen_efi_init(). So I suggest you just clone the function and only keep the pieces that make sense for Xen. -- Ard. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |