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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC v2 00/12] xen/x86: use per-vcpu stacks for 64 bit pv domains

>>> On 22.01.18 at 16:00, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 22/01/18 15:48, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 22.01.18 at 15:38, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 22/01/18 15:22, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>> On 22.01.18 at 15:18, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> On 22/01/18 13:50, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 22.01.18 at 13:32, <jgross@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>>> As a preparation for doing page table isolation in the Xen hypervisor
>>>>>>> in order to mitigate "Meltdown" use dedicated stacks, GDT and TSS for
>>>>>>> 64 bit PV domains mapped to the per-domain virtual area.
>>>>>>> The per-vcpu stacks are used for early interrupt handling only. After
>>>>>>> saving the domain's registers stacks are switched back to the normal
>>>>>>> per physical cpu ones in order to be able to address on-stack data
>>>>>>> from other cpus e.g. while handling IPIs.
>>>>>>> Adding %cr3 switching between saving of the registers and switching
>>>>>>> the stacks will enable the possibility to run guest code without any
>>>>>>> per physical cpu mapping, i.e. avoiding the threat of a guest being
>>>>>>> able to access other domains data.
>>>>>>> Without any further measures it will still be possible for e.g. a
>>>>>>> guest's user program to read stack data of another vcpu of the same
>>>>>>> domain, but this can be easily avoided by a little PV-ABI modification
>>>>>>> introducing per-cpu user address spaces.
>>>>>>> This series is meant as a replacement for Andrew's patch series:
>>>>>>> "x86: Prerequisite work for a Xen KAISER solution".
>>>>>> Considering in particular the two reverts, what I'm missing here
>>>>>> is a clear description of the meaningful additional protection this
>>>>>> approach provides over the band-aid. For context see also
>>>>>> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-01/msg01735.html
>>>>> My approach supports mapping only the following data while the guest is
>>>>> running (apart form the guest's own data, of course):
>>>>> - the per-vcpu entry stacks of the domain which will contain only the
>>>>>   guest's registers saved when an interrupt occurs
>>>>> - the per-vcpu GDTs and TSSs of the domain
>>>>> - the IDT
>>>>> - the interrupt handler code (arch/x86/x86_64/[compat/]entry.S
>>>>> All other hypervisor data and code can be completely hidden from the
>>>>> guests.
>>>> I understand that. What I'm not clear about is: Which parts of
>>>> the additionally hidden data are actually necessary (or at least
>>>> very desirable) to hide?
>>> Necessary:
>>> - other guests' memory (e.g. physical memory 1:1 mapping)
>>> - data from other guests e.g.in stack pages, debug buffers, I/O buffers,
>>>   code emulator buffers
>>> - other guests' register values e.g. in vcpu structure
>> All of this is already being made invisible by the band-aid (with the
>> exception of leftovers on the hypervisor stacks across context
>> switches, which we've already said could be taken care of by
>> memset()ing that area). I'm asking about the _additional_ benefits
>> of your approach.
> I'm quite sure the performance will be much better as it doesn't require
> per physical cpu L4 page tables, but just a shadow L4 table for each
> guest L4 table, similar to the Linux kernel KPTI approach.

But isn't that model having the same synchronization issues upon
guest L4 updates which Andrew was fighting with?


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