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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v9 02/11] x86/cpuid: Handling of IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBRS for guests

>>> On 19.01.18 at 11:53, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 19/01/18 10:40, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 18.01.18 at 16:46, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> For guest safety, we treat STIBP as special, always override the toolstack
>>> choice, and always advertise STIBP if IBRS is available.  This removes the
>>> corner case where STIBP is not advertised, but the guest is running on
>>> HT-capable hardware where it does matter.
>> I guess the answer to my question may live somewhere later in the
>> series, but since I haven't got there yet: Is this based on the
>> assumption that on HT-capable hardware they would always be
>> available together? Otherwise, how do you emulate STIBP for the
>> guest if all you've got is IBRS/IBPB?
> The safety depends on the guest seeing STIBP and using it if it wants
> to.  (Not that I've seen any sign of STIBP in the Linux code, or from
> observing what Windows appears to do).
> For topology reasons (despite the other cans of worms in this area), we
> unilaterally set HT, so all guests should find themselves on HT-capable
> systems.

But this doesn't answer my question: What do you do if the guest
uses STIBP (because you've told it that it can), but the hardware
doesn't support it? Aren't you producing a false sense of security
to the guest this way?


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