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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] fix potential null dereference



On 18/01/2018 22:11, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> On Tue, 16 Jan 2018, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 15.01.18 at 19:51, <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 15 Jan 2018, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>>> On 13.01.18 at 07:21, <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> On 01/12/2018 11:40 PM, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
>>>>>> handles can theoretically be NULL, check for it explicitly before
>>>>>> dereferencing it.
>>>>> I doubt handles could be NULL if LocateHandle succeed. This seems to be 
>>>>> confirmed by the spec (Page 208 in UEFI spec 2.7).
>>>>>
>>>>> So I am not entirely convince we should add yet another check in the 
>>>>> code. An ASSERT might be better.
>>>> Indeed if there is a platform where NULL is coming back in the
>>>> success case, that platform should be named as a justification
>>>> in the commit message. Otherwise I don't see the value of this
>>>> change.
>>> Truthfully, it is mostly to silence Coverity. We can all appreciate when
>>> static analysts cannot find defects in the code.
>> So what does Coverity dislike here (the more that this is on a
>> boot path, i.e. not exploitable by guests at all in the first place)?
>> Merely the NULL pointer? What if the interface gave back a
>> pointer with a value of 0x123456789abcdef?
> Coverity complains "Dereferencing null pointer handles". The code path
> to get to that point is the following, as explained by Coverity:
>
>   - handles is set to NULL at the beginning of efi_get_gop
>   - status is not EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, AllocatePool is not called, handles 
> is still NULL
>   - later we call efi_bs->HandleProtocol(handles[i], "Dereferencing null 
> pointer handles"
>
> Given that in the first call to LocateHandle we pass size == 0, by the
> spec I don't see how it can return anything other than EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
>
> In other words, if LocateHandle complies, then the code is correct. I'll
> mark it as won't fix.

EFI is full of UB because of needing to pass and cast pointers with
*(void **), and Coverity has a hard time following these (as a direct
consequence of the compilers having a hard time following them).

As for the spec however, that is irrelevant.  The point is that there
are billions of other integers which could be returned which aren't
TOO_SMALL and OK, and without the EFI firmware source code to inspect,
Coverity can't know.

Also, I'd like to see any EFI anywhere which successfully implements the
spec...

~Andrew

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