[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v9 03/11] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests
As per the spec currently available here: https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/c5/63/336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES will only come into existence on new hardware, but is implemented as a straight #GP for now to avoid being leaky when new hardware arrives. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> v9: * Alter the STIBP handling to match Intel's latest spec * Drop spec_ctrl.guest as it is no longer needed --- xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 ++ xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 10 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index 187f862..7875d9c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -120,11 +120,22 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v) int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) { + const struct cpuid_policy *cp = v->domain->arch.cpuid; const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = v->domain->arch.msr; const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr; switch ( msr ) { + case MSR_PRED_CMD: + /* Write-only */ + goto gp_fault; + + case MSR_SPEC_CTRL: + if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb ) + goto gp_fault; + *val = vp->spec_ctrl.raw; + break; + case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO: if ( !dp->plaform_info.available ) goto gp_fault; @@ -132,6 +143,10 @@ int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) _MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULTING; break; + case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + /* Not implemented yet. */ + goto gp_fault; + case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES: if ( !vp->misc_features_enables.available ) goto gp_fault; @@ -153,14 +168,44 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) { const struct vcpu *curr = current; struct domain *d = v->domain; + const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid; struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr; struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr; switch ( msr ) { case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO: + case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + /* Read-only */ goto gp_fault; + case MSR_SPEC_CTRL: + if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb ) + goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */ + + /* + * Note: SPEC_CTRL_STIBP is specified as safe to use (i.e. ignored) + * when STIBP isn't enumerated in hardware. + */ + + if ( val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ) + goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */ + + vp->spec_ctrl.raw = val; + break; + + case MSR_PRED_CMD: + if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb && !cp->extd.ibpb ) + goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */ + + /* + * The only defined behaviour is when writing PRED_CMD_IBPB. In + * practice, real hardware accepts any value without faulting. + */ + if ( v == curr && (val & PRED_CMD_IBPB) ) + wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + break; + case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES: { uint64_t rsvd = ~0ull; diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h index a0aacfa..23ad743 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ #define MSR_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB (_AC(1, ULL) << 0) +#define MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a + /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1 #define MSR_IA32_A_PERFCTR0 0x000004c1 diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h index 2fbed02..928f1cc 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h @@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ struct msr_domain_policy /* MSR policy object for per-vCPU MSRs */ struct msr_vcpu_policy { + /* 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL */ + struct { + /* + * Only the bottom two bits are defined, so no need to waste space + * with uint64_t at the moment, but use uint32_t for the convenience + * of the assembly code. + */ + uint32_t raw; + } spec_ctrl; + /* 0x00000140 MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES */ struct { bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */ -- 2.1.4 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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