Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 1/2] x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests

[Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 05:28:40PM +0000, Andy Smith wrote:
> Hi Jan,
> 
> On Tue, Jan 16, 2018 at 08:21:52AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote:
> > This is a very simplistic change limiting the amount of memory a running
> > 64-bit PV guest has mapped (and hence available for attacking): Only the
> > mappings of stack, IDT, and TSS are being cloned from the direct map
> > into per-CPU page tables.
> 
> Can this be used with Comet/Vixen to further protect PV guests? i.e.
> if the shim hypervisor has these changes then will it also limit
> what a process in the PV guest can see in that shim hypervisor,
> which therefore protects its own guest kernel a bit too?
> 

Yes, but please be warned that the guest is very very slow. I don't
think XPTI + shim is very usable at this stage.

If you're interested in trying that out, check out staging branch and
build a shim from there.

Wei.

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