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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests

On Jan 12, 2018, at 05:19, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
> This is a very simplistic change limiting the amount of memory a running
> 64-bit PV guest has mapped (and hence available for attacking): Only the
> mappings of stack, IDT, and TSS are being cloned from the direct map
> into per-CPU page tables. Guest controlled parts of the page tables are
> being copied into those per-CPU page tables upon entry into the guest.
> Cross-vCPU synchronization of top level page table entry changes is
> being effected by forcing other active vCPU-s of the guest into the
> hypervisor.
> The change to context_switch() isn't strictly necessary, but there's no
> reason to keep switching page tables once a PV guest is being scheduled
> out.
> There is certainly much room for improvement, especially of performance,
> here - first and foremost suppressing all the negative effects on AMD
> systems. But in the interest of backportability (including to really old
> hypervisors, which may not even have alternative patching) any such is
> being left out here.

Thanks for releasing this patch to support use cases not covered by the 
previous mitigations.  Is there a name or acronym we can use to reference this 
patch in the FAQ, XSA and other support documents?

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