[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: Meltdown band-aid against malicious 64-bit PV guests
On 12/01/18 17:34, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > On Fri, 12 Jan 2018, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 12.01.18 at 18:02, <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 03:19:38AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> @@ -799,6 +982,10 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned in >>>> >>>> stack_base[0] = stack_start; >>>> >>>> + if ( !setup_cpu_root_pgt(0) ) >>>> + panic("No memory for root page table\n"); >>>> + get_cpu_info()->pv_cr3 = __pa(per_cpu(root_pgt, 0)); >>> Wouldn't it be helpful to have a command line option to decide whether >>> to enable this feature or not? >> Well, that would be an option, but falling into the optimization >> category. Once the basic concept has been proven by a 2nd >> party to have no obvious flaws, along with backporting some >> of the improvements would be my goal to work on, but the >> latter behind looking at the Spectre patches (i.e. I first want >> to get all fixes sorted, and then deal with improvements). > That's an amazing work, Jan. Thank you! Finally, a fix I can deploy. As > soon as this patch is properly verified, I think we should update all > references to Meltdown in our docs and advisories to point to this fix. This is far from a complete fix, but if it works, it is a good start. I'm currently reviewing/investigating and seeing how easy it might be to merge with my KAISER series (which is several months closer towards a complete fix). ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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