Re: [Xen-devel] Radical proposal v2: Publish Amazon's verison now, Citrix's version soon [and 1 more messages]

[Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 04:39:11PM +0000, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Jan Beulich writes ("Re: Radical proposal v2: Publish Amazon's verison now, 
> Citrix's version soon"):
> > There are a couple of instances of "a branch", and I'm not really
> > clear on which one that would be, yet in part my opinion depends
> > on that, as this will affect what state certain branches will be in
> > for subsequent work. As I agree with the PVH shim being the
> > better baseline for work going forward, in particular I wouldn't like
> > to see the Vixen series becoming the base of any branch going to
> > be maintained going forward.
> 
> Anthony Liguori writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Radical proposal v2: Publish 
> Amazon's verison now, Citrix's version soon"):
> > What I would suggest is the following:
> > 1) Merge Vixen into staging
> > 2) Backport Vixen into stable-4.10 and cut a release
> 
> We do not have time any longer (if we had time to start with) to
> reconcile these divergent views.
> 
> 
> Hence George's suggestion, which bypasses the problem.  By "a branch"
> we mean some git branch on xenbits which is not any of our usual git
> branches, and which we expect to die fairly soon.
> 
> Jan, I suggest
> 
>    https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/xen.git
>      refs/heads/4.10.meltdown.vixen
>      refs/tags/4.10.meltdown.vixen.1   (signed by usual key)
> 
> If we can't agree to that[1] then I intend the following:
> 
>    https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/people/iwj/xen.git
>      refs/heads/meltdown/4.10.meltdown.vixen
>      refs/tags/4.10.meltdown.vixen.1   (signed by me personally)
> 
> [1] I am happy to accept any reasonable counterproposal for the exact
> branch and tag names.
> 
> 
> Separately, I would like to say that this branch will receive security
> support from the Xen Project Security Team, but that security support
> will be withdrawn at no less than 2 months' notice when a final
> solution is availabler.

I would add that security support will be limited to issues which
affect the security of the shim guest (ie: like being able to break
from user to kernel level or similar). IMHO a warning should be added
somewhere that this branch should not be used as a bare-metal
hypervisor.

Roger.

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