[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v17 06/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: add a new mappable resource type...
>>> On 03.01.18 at 17:06, <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jan Beulich [mailto:JBeulich@xxxxxxxx] >> Sent: 03 January 2018 15:48 >> To: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> >> Cc: JulienGrall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>; Andrew Cooper >> <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>; George >> Dunlap <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>; Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>; >> Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; >> Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>; Tim (Xen.org) >> <tim@xxxxxxx> >> Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 06/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: add a new mappable >> resource type... >> >> >>> On 03.01.18 at 13:19, <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > +static void hvm_free_ioreq_mfn(struct hvm_ioreq_server *s, bool buf) >> > +{ >> > + struct domain *d = s->domain; >> > + struct hvm_ioreq_page *iorp = buf ? &s->bufioreq : &s->ioreq; >> > + >> > + if ( !iorp->page ) >> > + return; >> > + >> > + page_list_add_tail(iorp->page, &d- >> >arch.hvm_domain.ioreq_server.pages); >> >> Afaict s->domain is the guest, not the domain containing the >> emulator. Hence this new model of freeing the pages is safe only >> when the emulator domain is dead by the time the guest is being >> cleaned up. > > From the investigations done w.r.t. the grant table pages I don't think this > is the case. The emulating domain will have references on the pages and this > keeps the target domain in existence, only completing domain destruction when > the references are finally dropped. I've tested this by leaving an emulator > running whilst I 'xl destroy' the domain; the domain remains as a zombie > until emulator terminates. Actually, after further thinking about this, it looks as if such behavior was a problem by itself if the dm domain is unprivileged: It shouldn't be allowed to prevent the guest being fully cleaned up, or else it would be both a meaningful memory leak as well as a domain ID one, eventually leading to the inability to create new domains. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
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