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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
v3:
* Brackets around && (.. & ..) operation
* Extend host to uint32_t for the benefit of the asm code.
v4:
* Extend MSR_PRED_CMD availability logic for AMD.
---
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 31983ed..02a7b49 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -119,11 +119,22 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v)
int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
{
+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = v->domain->arch.cpuid;
const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = v->domain->arch.msr;
const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
switch ( msr )
{
+ case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+ /* Write-only */
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ *val = vp->spec_ctrl.guest;
+ break;
+
case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
if ( !dp->plaform_info.available )
goto gp_fault;
@@ -152,14 +163,38 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t
val)
{
const struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = v->domain;
+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid;
struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr;
struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
switch ( msr )
{
case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
+ /* Read-only */
goto gp_fault;
+ case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
+ if ( val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS |
+ (cp->feat.stibp ? SPEC_CTRL_STIBP : 0)) )
+ goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
+ vp->spec_ctrl.guest = val;
+ vp->spec_ctrl.host = val;
+ break;
+
+ case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb && !cp->extd.ibpb )
+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
+
+ /*
+ * The only defined behaviour is when writing PRED_CMD_IBPB. In
+ * practice, real hardware accepts any value without faulting.
+ */
+ if ( v == curr && (val & PRED_CMD_IBPB) )
+ wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ break;
+
case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
{
uint64_t rsvd = ~0ull;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
index 2fbed02..3d0012d 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
@@ -223,6 +223,18 @@ struct msr_domain_policy
/* MSR policy object for per-vCPU MSRs */
struct msr_vcpu_policy
{
+ /* 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+ struct {
+ /*
+ * Only the bottom two bits are defined, so no need to waste space
+ * with uint64_t at the moment. We maintain the guests idea of the
+ * value it wrote, and a value to install into hardware (extended to
+ * uint32_t to simplify the asm) which might be different.
+ */
+ uint32_t host;
+ uint8_t guest;
+ } spec_ctrl;
+
/* 0x00000140 MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES */
struct {
bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */
--
2.1.4
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