Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/mm: Change default value for suppress #VE in set_mem_access()

[Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 10:57 AM, George Dunlap
<george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 07/20/2017 05:46 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 10:43 AM, George Dunlap
>> <George.Dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 7:24 PM, Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> 
>>> wrote:
>>>>> I think the issue would be whether to allow a domain to set/clear the
>>>>> suppress #VE bit for its pages by calling the new HVMOP on itself.
>>>>
>>>> This problem is not limited to setting the SVE bit. It also applies to
>>>> swapping altp2m views. Pretty much all altp2m HVMOPs can be issued
>>>> from a user-space program without any way to check whether that
>>>> process is allowed to do that or not. If you don't think it is safe
>>>> for a domain to set SVE, the none of the altp2m ops are safe for the
>>>> domain to issue on itself. If we could say ensure only the kernel can
>>>> issue the hvmops, that would be OK. But that's not possible at the
>>>> moment AFAICT.
>>>
>>> Wait, is that right?  I think we normally restrict hypercalls to only
>>> being made from the guest kernel, don't we?
>>>
>>
>> If that's the case then it's good to know (can you point me where that
>> restriction is done?) I was just referring to the fact that
>> technically a userspace program can issue VMCALL.
>
> Well for vmcall in particular, it's in
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall/hvm_hypercall().  The check for PV guests is
> in xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S:lstar_enter.  Other checks are left as an
> exercise for the reader. :-)

Thanks ;) I'm looking through it.

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