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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/3] x86/altp2m: Add a hvmop for setting the suppress #VE bit
>>> On 18.05.17 at 17:07, <apop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c
> @@ -466,6 +466,54 @@ int p2m_get_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn,
> xenmem_access_t *access)
> }
>
> /*
> + * Set/clear the #VE suppress bit for a page. Only available on VMX.
> + */
> +int p2m_set_suppress_ve(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint8_t suppress_ve,
suppress_ve presumably is meant to be boolean.
> + unsigned int altp2m_idx)
> +{
> + struct p2m_domain *host_p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(d);
> + struct p2m_domain *ap2m = NULL;
> + struct p2m_domain *p2m = NULL;
Pointless initializer.
> + mfn_t mfn;
> + p2m_access_t a;
> + p2m_type_t t;
> + unsigned long gfn_l;
Please avoid this local variable and use gfn_x() in the two places
you need to.
> + int rc = 0;
Pointless initializer again.
> +
> + if ( !cpu_has_vmx )
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
Is this enough? Wouldn't it be better to signal the caller whenever
hardware (or even software) isn't going to honor the request?
> + if ( altp2m_idx > 0 )
> + {
> + if ( altp2m_idx >= MAX_ALTP2M ||
> + d->arch.altp2m_eptp[altp2m_idx] == mfn_x(INVALID_MFN) )
Indentation.
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + p2m = ap2m = d->arch.altp2m_p2m[altp2m_idx];
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + p2m = host_p2m;
> + }
Unnecessary braces.
> + p2m_lock(host_p2m);
> + if ( ap2m )
> + p2m_lock(ap2m);
> +
> + gfn_l = gfn_x(gfn);
> + mfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn_l, &t, &a, 0, NULL, NULL);
> + if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) )
> + return -ESRCH;
> + rc = p2m->set_entry(p2m, gfn_l, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K, t, a,
> + suppress_ve);
> + if ( ap2m )
> + p2m_unlock(ap2m);
> + p2m_unlock(host_p2m);
To fiddle with a single gfn, this looks to be very heavy locking.
While for now gfn_lock() is the same as p2m_lock(), from an
abstract perspective I'd expect gfn_lock() to suffice here at
least in the non-altp2m case.
And then there are two general questions: Without a libxc layer
function, how is one supposed to use this new sub-op? Is it
really intended to permit a guest to call this for itself?
Jan
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