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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 2/2] kexec: remove spinlock now that all KEXEC hypercall ops are protected at the top-level



On 04/19/2017 08:37 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 19.04.17 at 14:13, <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 05:20:50AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 19.04.17 at 12:56, <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:49:48AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 17.04.17 at 21:09, <eric.devolder@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The spinlock in kexec_swap_images() was removed as
this function is only reachable on the kexec hypercall, which is
now protected at the top-level in do_kexec_op_internal(),
thus the local spinlock is no longer necessary.

But perhaps leave an ASSERT() there, making sure the in-hypercall
flag is set?

I am not sure why but if at all I think that we should also consider
other key kexec functions then. Or put ASSERT() into do_kexec_op_internal()
just before "switch ( op )".

The point of my placement suggestion was that the ASSERT()
effectively replaces the lock acquire - the places you name
didn't previously require any synchronization.

After the first patch of this series kexec_swap_images() cannot be
started twice in parallel. So, I do not see the point of ASSERT() here.
Or let's say we wish to have it to double check that "the in-hypercall
flag is set". AIUI, it is your original idea. However, then I think that
we should have an ASSERT() at least in kexec_load_slot() because parallel
loads make issues too. And we can go higher to feel more safe. That is
why I suggested do_kexec_op_internal() as the final resting place for
an ASSERT(). Simply it looks to me the safest approach. Am I missing
something?

The point you're missing is - why don't you then move the ASSERT()
yet one more level up, right next to where the flag is being set? IOW
what you suggest would imo rather mean not adding any assertion
at all.

I've just posted v3 of this patch with the ASSERT in lieu of the spin_lock().

Eric



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