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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v12 6/7] VT-d: introduce update_irte to update irte safely



> From: Gao, Chao
> Sent: Thursday, April 6, 2017 8:30 AM
> 
> We used structure assignment to update irte which was non-atomic when
> the
> whole IRTE was to be updated. It is unsafe when a interrupt happened
> during
> update. Furthermore, no bug or warning would be reported when this
> happened.
> 
> This patch introduces two variants, atomic and non-atomic, to update irte.
> For initialization and release case, the non-atomic variant will be used. for
> other cases (such as reprogramming to set irq affinity), the atomic variant
> will be used. If the caller requests a atomic update but we can't meet it, we

'a'->'an'. I thought whether above should be updated since two helpers
are removed now. But possibly still OK based on purpose of 'atomic'
parameter in update_irte. :-)

> raise a bug.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> v12:
> - use write_atomic in update_irte
> - add description to explain why no one won't change the IRTE entry which is
> using in update_irte(). Also add assertion to verify it.
> - rename the new flag in msi_desc to irte_initialized
> - remove two helper function update_irte_{atomic/nonatomic}
> 
> v11:
> - Add two variant function to update IRTE. Call the non-atomic one for init
> and clear operations. Call the atomic one for other cases.
> - Add a new field to indicate the remap_entry associated with msi_desc is
> initialized or not.
> 
> v10:
> - rename copy_irte_to_irt to update_irte
> - remove copy_from_to_irt
> - change commmit message and add some comments to illustrate on which
> condition update_irte() is safe.
> 
>  xen/arch/x86/msi.c                     |  1 +
>  xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c | 61
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>  xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h              |  1 +
>  3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> index 3374cd4..d98f400 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> @@ -579,6 +579,7 @@ static struct msi_desc *alloc_msi_entry(unsigned int
> nr)
>          entry[nr].irq = -1;
>          entry[nr].remap_index = -1;
>          entry[nr].pi_desc = NULL;
> +        entry[nr].irte_initialized = false;
>      }
> 
>      return entry;
> diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
> b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
> index a18717b..a7bdbe4 100644
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
> @@ -169,10 +169,55 @@ bool_t __init iommu_supports_eim(void)
>      return 1;
>  }
> 
> +/*
> + * Assume iremap_lock has been acquired. It is to make sure software will
> not
> + * change the same IRTE behind us. With this assumption, if only high
> qword or
> + * low qword in IRTE is to be updated, this function's atomic variant can
> + * present an atomic update to VT-d hardware even when cmpxchg16b
> + * instruction is not supported.
> + */
> +static void update_irte(struct iommu *iommu, struct iremap_entry *entry,
> +                        const struct iremap_entry *new_ire, bool atomic)
> +{
> +    ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&iommu_ir_ctrl(iommu)->iremap_lock));
> +
> +    if ( cpu_has_cx16 )
> +    {
> +        __uint128_t ret;
> +        struct iremap_entry old_ire;
> +
> +        old_ire = *entry;
> +        ret = cmpxchg16b(entry, &old_ire, new_ire);
> +
> +        /*
> +         * In the above, we use cmpxchg16 to atomically update the 128-bit
> +         * IRTE, and the hardware cannot update the IRTE behind us, so
> +         * the return value of cmpxchg16 should be the same as old_ire.
> +         * This ASSERT validate it.
> +         */
> +        ASSERT(ret == old_ire.val);
> +    }
> +    else
> +    {
> +        /*
> +         * If the caller requests a atomic update but we can't meet it,

'a'->'an'

Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>

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