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Re: [Xen-devel] RFC: Adding a section to the Xen security policy about what constitutes a vulnerability



On Wed, Jan 4, 2017 at 12:36 PM, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 4. The security team will only issue an advisory if there is a known
> combination of software in which the vulnerability can be exploited.
>
> In most cases, the software which contains the bug is also the target
> of the attack: that is, a bug in Xen allows an unprivileged user to
> crash Xen, a bug in QEMU allows an unprivileged user to escalate its
> privileges to that of the QEMU process.  In these cases "using Xen" or
> "using QEMU" imples "being vulnerable".
>
> But this is not always so: for instance, a bug in the Xen instruction
> emulator might allow a guest user to attack the guest kernel, *if* the
> guest kernel behaves in a certain way, but not if it behaves in other
> ways.  In such a case, a bug will only be considered a vulnerability
> if there are known operating systems on which the attack can be
> executed.  If no operating system can be found which allows such an
> attack, no advisory will be issued.
>
> If a bug requires a vulnerable operating system to be exploitable, the
> Xen Security Team will pro-actively investigate the vulnerability of
> the following open-source operating systems: Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD,
> and NetBSD.  The security team may also test or otherwise investigate
> the vulnerability of some proprietary operating systems.
>
> (An example of this scenario is XSA-176: There was a bug in the
> handling of the pagetable PS bits for L3 and L4; but no known
> operating systems were vulnerable to an exploit as a result of the
> bug.  Under these guidelines, XSA-176 would not have been issued.)

One thing to consider: This formulation would also exclude bugs in
libxl that weren't exploitable under either xl or libvirt (the only
known toolstacks that link against libxl).  I'm of two minds about
that restriction; and I'm not immediately sure what promise we would
make instead.  (Make an exception for libxl, perhaps?  Or specify that
it's only operating systems for which there must be a known example?)

 -George

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