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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/xen: Add a Xen-specific sync_core() implementation



On 12/02/2016 06:44 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 02/12/16 00:35, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Xen PV, CPUID is likely to trap, and Xen hypercalls aren't
>> guaranteed to serialize.  (Even CPUID isn't *really* guaranteed to
>> serialize on Xen PV, but, in practice, any trap it generates will
>> serialize.)
> Well, Xen will enabled CPUID Faulting wherever it can, which is
> realistically all IvyBridge hardware and newer.
>
> All hypercalls are a privilege change to cpl0.  I'd hope this condition
> is serialising, but I can't actually find any documentation proving or
> disproving this.
>
>> On my laptop, CPUID(eax=1, ecx=0) is ~83ns and IRET-to-self is
>> ~110ns.  But Xen PV will trap CPUID if possible, so IRET-to-self
>> should end up being a nice speedup.
>>
>> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC'ing xen-devel and the Xen maintainers in Linux.
>
> As this is the only email from this series in my inbox, I will say this
> here, but it should really be against patch 6.
>
> A write to %cr2 is apparently (http://sandpile.org/x86/coherent.htm) not
> serialising on the 486, but I don't have a manual to hand to check.
>
> ~Andrew
>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> index bdd855685403..1f765b41eee7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
>> @@ -311,6 +311,39 @@ static __read_mostly unsigned int 
>> cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask;
>>  static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_ecx_val;
>>  static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_edx_val;
>>  
>> +static void xen_sync_core(void)
>> +{
>> +    register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>> +    asm volatile (
>> +            "pushl %%ss\n\t"
>> +            "pushl %%esp\n\t"
>> +            "addl $4, (%%esp)\n\t"
>> +            "pushfl\n\t"
>> +            "pushl %%cs\n\t"
>> +            "pushl $1f\n\t"
>> +            "iret\n\t"
>> +            "1:"
>> +            : "+r" (__sp) : : "cc");

This breaks 32-bit PV guests.

Why are we pushing %ss? We are not changing privilege levels so why not
just flags, cs and eip (which, incidentally, does work)?

-boris

>> +#else
>> +    unsigned long tmp;
>> +
>> +    asm volatile (
>> +            "movq %%ss, %0\n\t"
>> +            "pushq %0\n\t"
>> +            "pushq %%rsp\n\t"
>> +            "addq $8, (%%rsp)\n\t"
>> +            "pushfq\n\t"
>> +            "movq %%cs, %0\n\t"
>> +            "pushq %0\n\t"
>> +            "pushq $1f\n\t"
>> +            "iretq\n\t"
>> +            "1:"
>> +            : "=r" (tmp), "+r" (__sp) : : "cc");
>> +#endif
>> +}
>> +
>>  static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx,
>>                    unsigned int *cx, unsigned int *dx)
>>  {
>> @@ -1289,6 +1322,8 @@ static const struct pv_cpu_ops xen_cpu_ops __initconst 
>> = {
>>  
>>      .start_context_switch = paravirt_start_context_switch,
>>      .end_context_switch = xen_end_context_switch,
>> +
>> +    .sync_core = xen_sync_core,
>>  };
>>  
>>  static void xen_reboot(int reason)


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