[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 4/6] x86/xstate: Fix latent bugs in expand_xsave_states()
>>> On 12.09.16 at 11:51, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > @@ -176,6 +187,11 @@ void expand_xsave_states(struct vcpu *v, void *dest, > unsigned int size) > u64 xstate_bv = xsave->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv; > u64 valid; > > + /* Check there is state to serialise (i.e. at least an XSAVE_HDR) */ > + BUG_ON(!v->arch.xcr0_accum); > + /* Check there is the correct room to decompress into. */ > + BUG_ON(size != xstate_ctxt_size(v->arch.xcr0_accum)); Further down I see you convert an ASSERT() to BUG_ON(), but I wonder why you do that and why the two above can't be ASSERT() too. xstate_ctxt_size() is not always cheap. > @@ -189,6 +205,7 @@ void expand_xsave_states(struct vcpu *v, void *dest, > unsigned int size) > * Copy legacy XSAVE area and XSAVE hdr area. > */ > memcpy(dest, xsave, XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE); > + memset(dest + XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE, 0, size - XSTATE_AREA_MIN_SIZE); > > ((struct xsave_struct *)dest)->xsave_hdr.xcomp_bv = 0; > > @@ -205,11 +222,9 @@ void expand_xsave_states(struct vcpu *v, void *dest, > unsigned int size) > > if ( src ) > { > - ASSERT((xstate_offsets[index] + xstate_sizes[index]) <= size); > + BUG_ON((xstate_offsets[index] + xstate_sizes[index]) <= size); Surely converting an ASSERT() to BUG_ON() means inverting the relational operator used? > memcpy(dest + xstate_offsets[index], src, xstate_sizes[index]); > } > - else > - memset(dest + xstate_offsets[index], 0, xstate_sizes[index]); So I have difficulty seeing why this memset() wasn't sufficient: It precisely covers for the respective component being in default state. Or wait - this was fine if intermediate bits were clear in xstate_bv, but not if clear-but-valid ones weren't followed by another set one. Nor would gaps between components have been taken care of. I think the commit message could be made more explicit in this regard (of course unless I'm overlooking yet another aspect). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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