[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

[Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/HVM: adjust feature checking in MSR intercept handling



Consistently consult hvm_cpuid(). With that, BNDCFGS gets better
handled outside of VMX specific code, just like XSS. Don't needlessly
check for MTRR support when the MSR being accessed clearly is not an
MTRR one.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -309,6 +309,14 @@ int hvm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu *v, u6
     return 1;
 }
 
+bool hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val)
+{
+    return hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs &&
+           is_canonical_address(val) &&
+           !(val & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) &&
+           hvm_funcs.set_guest_bndcfgs(v, val);
+}
+
 /*
  * Get the ratio to scale host TSC frequency to gtsc_khz. zero will be
  * returned if TSC scaling is unavailable or ratio cannot be handled
@@ -3628,28 +3636,30 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int
 {
     struct vcpu *v = current;
     uint64_t *var_range_base, *fixed_range_base;
-    bool_t mtrr;
-    unsigned int edx, index;
+    bool mtrr = false;
     int ret = X86EMUL_OKAY;
 
     var_range_base = (uint64_t *)v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.var_ranges;
     fixed_range_base = (uint64_t *)v->arch.hvm_vcpu.mtrr.fixed_ranges;
 
-    hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
-    mtrr = !!(edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR));
+    if ( msr == MSR_MTRRcap ||
+         (msr >= MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0) && msr <= MSR_MTRRdefType) )
+    {
+        unsigned int edx;
+
+        hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
+        if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR) )
+            mtrr = true;
+    }
 
     switch ( msr )
     {
+        unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, index;
+
     case MSR_EFER:
         *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer;
         break;
 
-    case MSR_IA32_XSS:
-        if ( !cpu_has_xsaves )
-            goto gp_fault;
-        *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss;
-        break;
-
     case MSR_IA32_TSC:
         *msr_content = _hvm_rdtsc_intercept();
         break;
@@ -3715,6 +3725,22 @@ int hvm_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int
         *msr_content = var_range_base[index];
         break;
 
+    case MSR_IA32_XSS:
+        ecx = 1;
+        hvm_cpuid(XSTATE_CPUID, &eax, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !(eax & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) )
+            goto gp_fault;
+        *msr_content = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss;
+        break;
+
+    case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+        ecx = 0;
+        hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) ||
+             !hvm_get_guest_bndcfgs(v, msr_content) )
+            goto gp_fault;
+        break;
+
     case MSR_K8_ENABLE_C1E:
     case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
          /*
@@ -3751,15 +3777,20 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
                             bool_t may_defer)
 {
     struct vcpu *v = current;
-    bool_t mtrr;
-    unsigned int edx, index;
+    bool mtrr = false;
     int ret = X86EMUL_OKAY;
 
     HVMTRACE_3D(MSR_WRITE, msr,
                (uint32_t)msr_content, (uint32_t)(msr_content >> 32));
 
-    hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
-    mtrr = !!(edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR));
+    if ( msr >= MSR_IA32_MTRR_PHYSBASE(0) && msr <= MSR_MTRRdefType )
+    {
+        unsigned int edx;
+
+        hvm_cpuid(1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &edx);
+        if ( edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MTRR) )
+            mtrr = true;
+    }
 
     if ( may_defer && unlikely(monitored_msr(v->domain, msr)) )
     {
@@ -3776,18 +3807,13 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
 
     switch ( msr )
     {
+        unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, index;
+
     case MSR_EFER:
         if ( hvm_set_efer(msr_content) )
            return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
         break;
 
-    case MSR_IA32_XSS:
-        /* No XSS features currently supported for guests. */
-        if ( !cpu_has_xsaves || msr_content != 0 )
-            goto gp_fault;
-        v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss = msr_content;
-        break;
-
     case MSR_IA32_TSC:
         hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, msr_content);
         break;
@@ -3824,9 +3850,8 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
         break;
 
     case MSR_MTRRcap:
-        if ( !mtrr )
-            goto gp_fault;
         goto gp_fault;
+
     case MSR_MTRRdefType:
         if ( !mtrr )
             goto gp_fault;
@@ -3866,6 +3891,23 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int
             goto gp_fault;
         break;
 
+    case MSR_IA32_XSS:
+        ecx = 1;
+        hvm_cpuid(XSTATE_CPUID, &eax, NULL, &ecx, NULL);
+        /* No XSS features currently supported for guests. */
+        if ( !(eax & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) || msr_content != 0 )
+            goto gp_fault;
+        v->arch.hvm_vcpu.msr_xss = msr_content;
+        break;
+
+    case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+        ecx = 0;
+        hvm_cpuid(7, NULL, &ebx, &ecx, NULL);
+        if ( !(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) ||
+             !hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(v, msr_content) )
+            goto gp_fault;
+        break;
+
     case MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG:
         /* ignore the write */
         break;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1224,6 +1224,28 @@ static int vmx_get_guest_pat(struct vcpu
     return 1;
 }
 
+static bool vmx_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val)
+{
+    ASSERT(cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx);
+
+    vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
+    __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, val);
+    vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_get_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 *val)
+{
+    ASSERT(cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx);
+
+    vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
+    __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, val);
+    vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
+
+    return true;
+}
+
 static void vmx_handle_cd(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long value)
 {
     if ( !paging_mode_hap(v->domain) )
@@ -2323,6 +2345,12 @@ const struct hvm_function_table * __init
     if ( cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling )
         vmx_function_table.tsc_scaling.ratio_frac_bits = 48;
 
+    if ( cpu_has_mpx && cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
+    {
+        vmx_function_table.set_guest_bndcfgs = vmx_set_guest_bndcfgs;
+        vmx_function_table.get_guest_bndcfgs = vmx_get_guest_bndcfgs;
+    }
+
     setup_vmcs_dump();
 
     return &vmx_function_table;
@@ -2646,11 +2674,6 @@ static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsign
     case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
         __vmread(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, msr_content);
         break;
-    case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
-        if ( !cpu_has_mpx || !cpu_has_vmx_mpx )
-            goto gp_fault;
-        __vmread(GUEST_BNDCFGS, msr_content);
-        break;
     case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
     case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC...MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
         if ( !nvmx_msr_read_intercept(msr, msr_content) )
@@ -2877,13 +2900,6 @@ static int vmx_msr_write_intercept(unsig
 
         break;
     }
-    case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
-        if ( !cpu_has_mpx || !cpu_has_vmx_mpx ||
-             !is_canonical_address(msr_content) ||
-             (msr_content & IA32_BNDCFGS_RESERVED) )
-            goto gp_fault;
-        __vmwrite(GUEST_BNDCFGS, msr_content);
-        break;
     case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
     case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC...MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
         if ( !nvmx_msr_write_intercept(msr, msr_content) )
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
     int  (*get_guest_pat)(struct vcpu *v, u64 *);
     int  (*set_guest_pat)(struct vcpu *v, u64);
 
+    bool (*get_guest_bndcfgs)(struct vcpu *v, u64 *);
+    bool (*set_guest_bndcfgs)(struct vcpu *v, u64);
+
     void (*set_tsc_offset)(struct vcpu *v, u64 offset, u64 at_tsc);
 
     void (*inject_trap)(const struct hvm_trap *trap);
@@ -383,6 +386,13 @@ static inline unsigned long hvm_get_shad
     return hvm_funcs.get_shadow_gs_base(v);
 }
 
+static inline bool hvm_get_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 *val)
+{
+    return hvm_funcs.get_guest_bndcfgs &&
+           hvm_funcs.get_guest_bndcfgs(v, val);
+}
+
+bool hvm_set_guest_bndcfgs(struct vcpu *v, u64 val);
 
 #define has_hvm_params(d) \
     ((d)->arch.hvm_domain.params != NULL)


Attachment: x86-HVM-feature-checks.patch
Description: Text document

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.