[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/8] x86/vm-event/monitor: relocate code-motion more appropriately
Hi Jan, On 7/4/2016 1:22 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: On 30.06.16 at 20:43, <czuzu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -475,8 +475,6 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)if ( unlikely(v->arch.vm_event) ){ - struct monitor_write_data *w = &v->arch.vm_event->write_data; - if ( v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags ) { enum emul_kind kind = EMUL_KIND_NORMAL; @@ -493,32 +491,10 @@ void hvm_do_resume(struct vcpu *v)v->arch.vm_event->emulate_flags = 0;} - - if ( w->do_write.msr ) - { - hvm_msr_write_intercept(w->msr, w->value, 0); - w->do_write.msr = 0; - } - - if ( w->do_write.cr0 ) - { - hvm_set_cr0(w->cr0, 0); - w->do_write.cr0 = 0; - } - - if ( w->do_write.cr4 ) - { - hvm_set_cr4(w->cr4, 0); - w->do_write.cr4 = 0; - } - - if ( w->do_write.cr3 ) - { - hvm_set_cr3(w->cr3, 0); - w->do_write.cr3 = 0; - } }+ arch_monitor_write_data(v);Why does this get moved outside the if(), with the same condition getting added inside the function (inverted for bailing early)? I left that so because of patch 5/8 - specifically, monitor_write_data handling shouldn't depend on the vm_event subsystem being initialized. But you're right, it still does depend on that initialization in this patch, so I should leave the call inside the if (and remove the check inside the function) as you suggest and only get it out in 5/8. Will do that in v2. @@ -119,6 +156,55 @@ bool_t monitored_msr(const struct domain *d, u32 msr) return test_bit(msr, bitmap); }+static void write_ctrlreg_adjust_traps(struct domain *d)+{ + struct vcpu *v; + struct arch_vmx_struct *avmx; + unsigned int cr3_bitmask; + bool_t cr3_vmevent, cr3_ldexit; + + /* Adjust CR3 load-exiting. */ + + /* vmx only */ + ASSERT(cpu_has_vmx); + + /* non-hap domains trap CR3 writes unconditionally */ + if ( !paging_mode_hap(d) ) + { + for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) + ASSERT(v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control & CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING); + return; + } + + cr3_bitmask = monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask(VM_EVENT_X86_CR3); + cr3_vmevent = !!(d->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & cr3_bitmask); + + for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) + { + avmx = &v->arch.hvm_vmx; + cr3_ldexit = !!(avmx->exec_control & CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING); + + if ( cr3_vmevent == cr3_ldexit ) + continue; + + /* + * If CR0.PE=0, CR3 load exiting must remain enabled. + * See vmx_update_guest_cr code motion for cr = 0. + */ + if ( cr3_ldexit && !hvm_paging_enabled(v) && !vmx_unrestricted_guest(v) ) + continue; + + if ( cr3_vmevent ) + avmx->exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING; + else + avmx->exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING; + + vmx_vmcs_enter(v); + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v); + vmx_vmcs_exit(v); + } +}While Razvan gave his ack already, I wonder whether it's really a good idea to put deeply VMX-specific code outside of a VMX-specific file. Jan Well, a summary of what this function does would sound like: "adjusts CR3 load-exiting for cr-write monitor vm-events". IMHO that's (monitor) vm-event specific enough to be placed within the vm-event subsystem. Could you suggest concretely how this separation would look like? (where to put this function/parts of it (and what parts), what name should it have once moved). Another reason this was done (besides avoiding hackishly doing a CR0 update when we actually need a CR3 update specifically for a vm-event to happen) is keeping symmetry between ARM<->X86 in a future patch that would implement monitor CR vm-events for ARM. In that patch write_ctrlreg_adjust_traps is renamed and implemented per-architecture, on ARM it would have the same job, i.e. updating some hypervisor traps (~ vmx execution controls) for CR vm-events to happen. On a different note, one thing I forgot to do though is to also move the following check (instead of completely removing it from arch_monitor_domctl_event): if ( VM_EVENT_X86_CR3 == mop->u.mov_to_cr.index ) inside write_ctrlreg_adjust_traps. Will remedy that in v2. Thanks, Corneliu. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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