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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 1/2] Interface for grant copy operation in libs.



On 22/06/16 12:21, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 10:37:24AM +0100, David Vrabel wrote:
>> On 22/06/16 09:38, Paulina Szubarczyk wrote:
>>> In a linux part an ioctl(gntdev, IOCTL_GNTDEV_GRANT_COPY, ..)
>>> system call is invoked. In mini-os the operation is yet not
>>> implemented. For other OSs there is a dummy implementation.
>> [...]
>>> --- a/tools/libs/gnttab/linux.c
>>> +++ b/tools/libs/gnttab/linux.c
>>> @@ -235,6 +235,51 @@ int osdep_gnttab_unmap(xengnttab_handle *xgt,
>>>      return 0;
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +int osdep_gnttab_grant_copy(xengnttab_handle *xgt,
>>> +                            uint32_t count,
>>> +                            xengnttab_grant_copy_segment_t *segs)
>>> +{
>>> +    int i, rc;
>>> +    int fd = xgt->fd;
>>> +    struct ioctl_gntdev_grant_copy copy;
>>> +
>>> +    copy.segments = calloc(count, sizeof(struct 
>>> ioctl_gntdev_grant_copy_segment));
>>> +    copy.count = count;
>>> +    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
>>> +    {
>>> +        copy.segments[i].flags = segs[i].flags;
>>> +        copy.segments[i].len = segs[i].len;
>>> +        if (segs[i].flags == GNTCOPY_dest_gref) 
>>> +        {
>>> +            copy.segments[i].dest.foreign.ref = segs[i].dest.foreign.ref;
>>> +            copy.segments[i].dest.foreign.domid = 
>>> segs[i].dest.foreign.domid;
>>> +            copy.segments[i].dest.foreign.offset = 
>>> segs[i].dest.foreign.offset;
>>> +            copy.segments[i].source.virt = segs[i].source.virt;
>>> +        } 
>>> +        else 
>>> +        {
>>> +            copy.segments[i].source.foreign.ref = 
>>> segs[i].source.foreign.ref;
>>> +            copy.segments[i].source.foreign.domid = 
>>> segs[i].source.foreign.domid;
>>> +            copy.segments[i].source.foreign.offset = 
>>> segs[i].source.foreign.offset;
>>> +            copy.segments[i].dest.virt = segs[i].dest.virt;
>>> +        }
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    rc = ioctl(fd, IOCTL_GNTDEV_GRANT_COPY, &copy);
>>> +    if (rc) 
>>> +    {
>>> +        GTERROR(xgt->logger, "ioctl GRANT COPY failed %d ", errno);
>>> +    }
>>> +    else 
>>> +    {
>>> +        for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
>>> +            segs[i].status = copy.segments[i].status;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    free(copy.segments);
>>> +    return rc;
>>> +}
>>
>> I know Wei asked for this but you've replaced what should be a single
>> pointer assignment with a memory allocation and two loops over all the
>> segments.
>>
>> This is a hot path and the two structures (the libxengnttab one and the
>> Linux kernel one) are both part of their respective ABIs and won't
>> change so Wei's concern that they might change in the future is unfounded.
>>
> 
> The fundamental question is: will the ABI between the library and the
> kernel ever go mismatch?
> 
> My answer is "maybe".  My rationale is that everything goes across
> boundary of components need to be considered with caution. And I tend to
> assume the worst things will happen.
> 
> To guarantee that they will never go mismatch is to have
> 
>    typedef ioctl_gntdev_grant_copy_segment xengnttab_grant_copy_segment_t;
> 
> But that's not how the code is written.
> 
> I would like to hear a third opinion. Is my concern unfounded? Am I too
> cautious? Is there any compelling argument that I missed?
> 
> Somewhat related, can we have some numbers please? It could well be the
> cost of the two loops is much cheaper than whatever is going on inside
> the kernel / hypervisor. And it could turn out that the numbers render
> this issue moot.

I did some (very) adhoc measurements and with the worst case of single
short segments for each ioctl, the optimized version of
osdep_gnttab_grant_copy() looks to be ~5% faster.

This is enough of a difference that we should use the optimized version.

The unoptimized version also adds an additional failure path (the
calloc) which would be best avoided.

David

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