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[Xen-devel] [xen-unstable-smoke test] 92847: regressions - FAIL



flight 92847 xen-unstable-smoke real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/92847/

Regressions :-(

Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386 9 debian-hvm-install fail REGR. vs. 
92731

Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt     12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl          12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl          13 saverestore-support-check    fail   never pass

version targeted for testing:
 xen                  4561569a11353688b97220be8d6a0821d53b97a6
baseline version:
 xen                  488c2a860a6d7eb69f4acfeb349b457aaba76dfa

Last test of basis    92731  2016-04-25 17:04:22 Z    0 days
Failing since         92827  2016-04-26 10:06:00 Z    0 days    2 attempts
Testing same since    92847  2016-04-26 14:02:28 Z    0 days    1 attempts

------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
  Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
  Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
  Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>

jobs:
 build-amd64                                                  pass    
 build-armhf                                                  pass    
 build-amd64-libvirt                                          pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl                                          pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-i386                     fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt                                     pass    


------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org
logs: /home/logs/logs
images: /home/logs/images

Logs, config files, etc. are available at
    http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs

Explanation of these reports, and of osstest in general, is at
    http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README.email;hb=master
    http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=osstest.git;a=blob;f=README;hb=master

Test harness code can be found at
    http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary


Not pushing.

------------------------------------------------------------
commit 4561569a11353688b97220be8d6a0821d53b97a6
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 13:47:21 2016 +0200

    x86/HVM: slightly improve hvm_mmio_{first,last}_byte()
    
    EFLAGS.DF can be assumed to be usually clear, so unlikely()-annotate
    the conditionals accordingly.
    
    Also prefer latching p->size (used twice) into a local variable, at
    once making it unnecessary for the reader to be sure expressions get
    evaluated left to right (operand promotion would yield a different
    result if p->addr + p->size - 1 was evaluted right to left).
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 276da2785e3797885aadb135a957279b73ecf076
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 13:47:02 2016 +0200

    x86/HVM: correct last address emulation acceptance check
    
    For REPeated memory access instructions the repeat count also needs to
    be considered. Utilize that "last" already takes this into account.
    
    Also defer computing "last" until we really know we need it.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 36e2f084ecb631838f04d73c6f7dc6bb305d0fe4
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 13:46:26 2016 +0200

    x86/mm: introduce modify_xen_mappings()
    
    To simply change the permissions on existing Xen mappings.  The existing
    destroy_xen_mappings() is altered to support changing the PTE permissions.
    
    A new destroy_xen_mappings() is introduced, as the special case of not 
passing
    _PAGE_PRESENT to modify_xen_mappings().
    
    As cleanup (and an ideal functional test), the boot logic which remaps Xen's
    code and data with reduced permissions is altered to use
    modify_xen_mappings(), rather than map_pages_to_xen() passing the same mfn's
    back in.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 722b6d259f408b80c40e3ddb6b5909414be31f57
Author: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 11:54:08 2016 +0200

    Revert "HYPERCALL_version_op. New hypercall mirroring XENVER_ but sane."
    
    This reverts commit 2716d875379d538c1dfccad78a99ca7db2e09f90.
    
    As it was decided that the existing XENVER hypercall - while having
    grown organically over the years can still be expanded.
    
    Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Requested-and-acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit f3598690741671a933eb372877bcb59f7036b1df
Author: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 11:53:49 2016 +0200

    Revert "libxc/libxl/python/xenstat/ocaml: Use new XEN_VERSION hypercall"
    
    This reverts commit d275ec9ca8a86f7c9c213f3551194d471ce90fbd.
    
    As we prefer to still utilize the old XENVER_ hypercall.
    
    Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 0129e1ee0d61fc93f6101332719d0bb5de6718ad
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 11:53:18 2016 +0200

    x86/xstate: don't clobber or leak state when using XSAVES
    
    Commit 4d27280572 ("x86/xsaves: fix overwriting between non-lazy/lazy
    xsaves") switched to always saving full state when using compacted
    format (which is the only one XSAVES allows). It didn't, however, also
    adjust the restore side: In order to save full state, we also need to
    make sure we always load full state, or else the subject vCPU's state
    would get clobbered by that of the vCPU which happened to last have in
    use the respective component(s).
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 3a6222bd57209d4c2f098d61ace042370a9b0a96
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 26 11:52:22 2016 +0200

    x86/vMSI-X: avoid missing first unmask of vectors
    
    Recent changes to Linux result in there just being a single unmask
    operation prior to expecting the first interrupts to arrive. However,
    we've had a chicken-and-egg problem here: Qemu invokes
    xc_domain_update_msi_irq(), ultimately leading to
    msixtbl_pt_register(), upon seeing that first unmask operation. Yet
    for msixtbl_range() to return true (in order to msixtbl_write() to get
    invoked at all) msixtbl_pt_register() must have completed.
    
    Deal with this by snooping suitable writes in msixtbl_range() and
    triggering the invocation of msix_write_completion() from
    msixtbl_pt_register() when that happens in the context of a still in
    progress vector control field write.
    
    Note that the seemingly unrelated deletion of the redundant
    irq_desc->msi_desc check in msixtbl_pt_register() is to make clear to
    any compiler version used that the "msi_desc" local variable isn't
    being used uninitialized. (Doing the same in msixtbl_pt_unregister() is
    just for consistency reasons.)
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
(qemu changes not included)

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