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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/2] IOMMU/MMU: Adjust top level functions for VT-d Device-TLB flush error.



On Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:54 AM, Quan Xu <quan.xu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> index c997b53..526548e 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
> @@ -2467,7 +2467,7 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, 
> unsigned long type,
>                             int preemptible)
>  {
>      unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info;
> -    int rc = 0;
> +    int rc = 0, ret = 0;
>
>      ASSERT(!(type & ~(PGT_type_mask | PGT_pae_xen_l2)));
>
> @@ -2578,11 +2578,11 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, 
> unsigned long type,
>          if ( d && is_pv_domain(d) && unlikely(need_iommu(d)) )
>          {
>              if ( (x & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page )
> -                iommu_unmap_page(d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)));
> +                ret = iommu_unmap_page(d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)));
>              else if ( type == PGT_writable_page )
> -                iommu_map_page(d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)),
> -                               page_to_mfn(page),
> -                               IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
> +                ret = iommu_map_page(d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)),
> +                                     page_to_mfn(page),
> +                                     IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
>          }
>      }
>
> @@ -2599,6 +2599,9 @@ static int __get_page_type(struct page_info *page, 
> unsigned long type,
>      if ( (x & PGT_partial) && !(nx & PGT_partial) )
>          put_page(page);
>
> +    if ( !rc )
> +        rc = ret;
> +

What's this about?  If the iommu_[un]map_page() operation times out,
we still go through with calling alloc_page_type(); and if
alloc_page_type() fails we return its failure value, but if it
succeeds, we return the error from iommu_[un]map_page()?

>      return rc;
>  }
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
> index 3cb6868..f9bcce7 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
> @@ -830,7 +830,15 @@ out:
>          {
>              if ( iommu_flags )
>                  for ( i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++ )
> -                    iommu_map_page(d, gfn + i, mfn_x(mfn) + i, iommu_flags);
> +                {
> +                    rc = iommu_map_page(d, gfn + i, mfn_x(mfn) + i, 
> iommu_flags);
> +                    if ( rc )
> +                    {
> +                        while ( i-- > 0 )
> +                            iommu_unmap_page(d, gfn + i);

This won't unmap gfn+0 (since it will break out when i == 0 without
calling unmap).

If i were signed, we could make the conditional ">= 0"; but
unfortunately it's unsigned, so you'll have to do something more
complicated.

While we're at it, is it worth adding "unlikely()" to the if() condition here?

> +                        break;
> +                    }
> +                }
>              else
>                  for ( i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++ )
>                      iommu_unmap_page(d, gfn + i);
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c
> index 3d80612..c33b753 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c
> @@ -680,8 +680,16 @@ p2m_pt_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long 
> gfn, mfn_t mfn,
>          }
>          else if ( iommu_pte_flags )
>              for ( i = 0; i < (1UL << page_order); i++ )
> -                iommu_map_page(p2m->domain, gfn + i, mfn_x(mfn) + i,
> -                               iommu_pte_flags);
> +            {
> +                rc = iommu_map_page(p2m->domain, gfn + i, mfn_x(mfn) + i,
> +                                    iommu_pte_flags);
> +                if ( rc )
> +                {
> +                    while ( i-- > 0 )
> +                        iommu_unmap_page(p2m->domain, gfn + i);

Same with gfn+0.

 -George

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