Re: [Xen-devel] [V2 PATCH 7/9] x86/hvm: pkeys, add pkeys support for guest_walk_tables

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 27/11/15 09:52, Huaitong Han wrote:
> This patch adds pkeys support for guest_walk_tables.
>
> Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@xxxxxxxxx>

You must CC the appropriate maintainer for this patch, which includes
the x86 MM maintainer.

> ---
>  xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c  | 65 
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h |  2 ++
>  2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> index 18d1acf..3e443b3 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ asm(".file \"" __OBJECT_FILE__ "\"");
>  #include <xen/sched.h>
>  #include <asm/page.h>
>  #include <asm/guest_pt.h>
> +#include <asm/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/i387.h>

I can see why you need xstate.h, but I why do you need i387.h ?

>  
>  extern const uint32_t gw_page_flags[];
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS
> @@ -90,6 +92,53 @@ static uint32_t set_ad_bits(void *guest_p, void *walk_p, 
> int set_dirty)
>      return 0;
>  }
>  
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +uint32_t leaf_pte_pkeys_check(struct vcpu *vcpu, uint32_t pfec,
> +                uint32_t pte_access, uint32_t pte_pkeys)

This is a latent linking bug for the future when 5 levels comes along.

It will probably be best to use the same trick as gw_page_flags to
compile it once but use it multiple times.

> +{
> +    bool_t pkru_ad, pkru_wd;
> +    bool_t ff, wf, uf, rsvdf, pkuf;
> +    unsigned int pkru = 0;
> +
> +    uf = pfec & PFEC_user_mode;
> +    wf = pfec & PFEC_write_access;
> +    rsvdf = pfec & PFEC_reserved_bit;
> +    ff = pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch;
> +    pkuf = pfec & PFEC_prot_key;
> +
> +    if ( !cpu_has_xsave || !pkuf || is_pv_vcpu(vcpu) )
> +        return 0;
> +
> +    vcpu_save_fpu(vcpu);
> +    pkru = *(unsigned int*)get_xsave_addr(vcpu->arch.xsave_area, 
> XSTATE_PKRU);

Style.

> +    if ( unlikely(pkru) )
> +    {
> +        /*
> +         * PKU:  additional mechanism by which the paging controls
> +         * access to user-mode addresses based on the value in the
> +         * PKRU register. A fault is considered as a PKU violation if all
> +         * of the following conditions are ture:
> +         * 1.CR4_PKE=1.
> +         * 2.EFER_LMA=1.
> +         * 3.page is present with no reserved bit violations.
> +         * 4.the access is not an instruction fetch.
> +         * 5.the access is to a user page.
> +         * 6.PKRU.AD=1
> +         *       or The access is a data write and PKRU.WD=1
> +         *            and either CR0.WP=1 or it is a user access.
> +         */
> +        pkru_ad = READ_PKRU_AD(pkru, pte_pkeys);
> +        pkru_wd = READ_PKRU_AD(pkru, pte_pkeys);
> +        if ( hvm_pku_enabled(vcpu) && hvm_long_mode_enabled(vcpu) &&
> +            !rsvdf && !ff && (pkru_ad ||
> +            (pkru_wd && wf && (hvm_wp_enabled(vcpu) || uf))))
> +            return 1;
> +    }
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  /* Walk the guest pagetables, after the manner of a hardware walker. */
>  /* Because the walk is essentially random, it can cause a deadlock 
>   * warning in the p2m locking code. Highly unlikely this is an actual
> @@ -106,6 +155,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
>      guest_l3e_t *l3p = NULL;
>      guest_l4e_t *l4p;
> +    uint32_t pkeys;
>  #endif
>      uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
>      bool_t smep = 0, smap = 0;
> @@ -190,6 +240,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>          goto out;
>      /* Get the l3e and check its flags*/
>      gw->l3e = l3p[guest_l3_table_offset(va)];
> +    pkeys = guest_l3e_get_pkeys(gw->l3e);
>      gflags = guest_l3e_get_flags(gw->l3e) ^ iflags;
>      if ( !(gflags & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) {
>          rc |= _PAGE_PRESENT;
> @@ -199,6 +250,9 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>      
>      pse1G = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_1G_superpages(v); 
>  
> +    if (pse1G && leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> +        rc |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT;
> +
>      if ( pse1G )
>      {
>          /* Generate a fake l1 table entry so callers don't all 
> @@ -270,6 +324,12 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>  
>      pse2M = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_superpages(v); 
>  
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +    pkeys = guest_l2e_get_pkeys(gw->l2e);
> +    if (pse2M && leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> +        rc |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT;
> +#endif
> +
>      if ( pse2M )
>      {
>          /* Special case: this guest VA is in a PSE superpage, so there's
> @@ -330,6 +390,11 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>              goto out;
>          }
>          rc |= ((gflags & mflags) ^ mflags);
> +#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
> +        pkeys = guest_l1e_get_pkeys(gw->l1e);
> +        if (leaf_pte_pkeys_check(v, pfec, gflags, pkeys))
> +            rc |= _PAGE_PKEY_BIT;
> +#endif

As I identified in v1, the fact that you do not modify the callers of
guest_walk_tables() proves that this change is buggy.  You must modify
the callers to cope with the new error of _PAGE_PKEY_BIT.

~Andrew

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