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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC 3/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Code for switching into/out of deprivileged mode

On 10/08/15 11:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 10/08/15 10:49, Tim Deegan wrote:

At 17:45 +0100 on 06 Aug (1438883118), Ben Catterall wrote:
The process to switch into and out of deprivileged mode can be likened to

To enter deprivileged mode, we take a copy of the stack from the guest's
registers up to the current stack pointer.
This copy is pretty unfortunate, but I can see that avoiding it will
be a bit complex.  Could we do something with more stacks?  AFAICS
there have to be three stacks anyway:

  - one to hold the depriv execution context;
  - one to hold the privileged execution context; and
  - one to take interrupts on.

So maybe we could do some fiddling to make Xen take interrupts on a
different stack while we're depriv'd?

That should happen naturally by virtue of the privilege level change
involved in taking the interrupt.  Conceptually, taking interrupts from
depriv mode is no different to taking them in a PV guest.

Some complications which come to mind (none insurmountable):

* Under this model, PV exception handlers should copy themselves onto
the privileged execution stack.
* Currently, the IST handlers  copy themselves onto the primary stack if
they interrupt guest context.
From what I understand from entry.S's assembly:
handle_ist_exception is used for machine_check and nmi ISTs and these perform this copy. The double fault handler does not do this copy.
 - we take the IST on a different stack page
- the handler copies the guest's registers from its current page to the bottom of the privileged stack so access routines for this still work as usual
 - Moves its rsp to just after this structure in the privileged stack
 - Calls do_nmi
 - does a ret_from_intr with the stack ptr on the privileged stack

Now, I _think_ it's sufficient to perform this copy and then just keep the rsp on the IST stack page (rather than moving it across as is currently done) so that we don't clobber the privileged stack.

Then, on the return path, move our rsp back to the privileged stack, just after the guest registers so that ret_from_intr can use the copied (and possibly modified) guest's registers.

Does that sound reasonable?

Thanks in advance!
* AMD Task Register on vmexit.  (this old gem)


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