[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/ldt: allow to disable modify_ldt at runtime
On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 11:23 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@xxxxxx> wrote: > For distros who prefer not to take the risk of completely disabling the > modify_ldt syscall using CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL, this patch adds a > sysctl to enable, temporarily disable, or permanently disable it at > runtime, and proposes to temporarily disable it by default. This can be > a safe alternative. A message is logged if an attempt was stopped so that > it's easy to spot if/when it is needed. > > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@xxxxxx> > --- > Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > kernel/sysctl.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt > index 6fccb69..55648b9 100644 > --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt > +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt > @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: > - kptr_restrict > - kstack_depth_to_print [ X86 only ] > - l2cr [ PPC only ] > +- modify_ldt [ X86 only ] > - modprobe ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt > - modules_disabled > - msg_next_id [ sysv ipc ] > @@ -391,6 +392,21 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. > If > > ============================================================== > > +modify_ldt: (X86 only) > + > +Enables (1), disables (0) or permanently disables (-1) the modify_ldt > syscall. > +Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a 16-bit or > +segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via a system call which > is > +not needed to run portable applications, and which can sometimes be abused to > +exploit some weaknesses of the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities. > + > +This sysctl allows one to increase the system's security by disabling the > +system call, or to restore compatibility with specific applications when it > +was already disabled. When permanently disabled, it is not possible to change > +the value anymore until the next system reboot. > + > +============================================================== > + > modules_disabled: > > A toggle value indicating if modules are allowed to be loaded > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index beabf30..88d10a0 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -2069,6 +2069,23 @@ config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL > surface. Disabling it removes the modify_ldt(2) system call. > > Saying 'N' here may make sense for embedded or server kernels. > + If really unsure, say 'Y', you'll be able to disable it at runtime. > + > +config DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL > + bool "Allow userspace to modify the LDT by default" > + depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL > + default y > + ---help--- > + Modifying the LDT (Local Descriptor Table) may be needed to run a > + 16-bit or segmented code such as Dosemu or Wine. This is done via > + a system call which is not needed to run portable applications, > + and which can sometimes be abused to exploit some weaknesses of > + the architecture, opening new vulnerabilities. > + > + For this reason this option allows one to enable or disable the > + feature at runtime. It is recommended to say 'N' here to leave > + the system protected, and to enable it at runtime only if needed > + by setting the sys.kernel.modify_ldt sysctl. > > source "kernel/livepatch/Kconfig" > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c > index 2bcc052..420fc8f 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ > #include <linux/sched.h> > #include <linux/string.h> > #include <linux/mm.h> > +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> > #include <linux/smp.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/vmalloc.h> > @@ -21,6 +22,11 @@ > #include <asm/mmu_context.h> > #include <asm/syscalls.h> > > +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL > +int sysctl_modify_ldt __read_mostly = > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEFAULT_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL); > +#endif > + > /* context.lock is held for us, so we don't need any locking. */ > static void flush_ldt(void *current_mm) > { > @@ -276,6 +282,15 @@ asmlinkage int sys_modify_ldt(int func, void __user *ptr, > { > int ret = -ENOSYS; > > + if (sysctl_modify_ldt <= 0) { > + printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO pr_info_ratelimited? *shrug* > + "Denied a call to modify_ldt() from %s[%d] (uid: %d)." > + " Adjust sysctl if this was not an exploit > attempt.\n", > + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), > + from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid())); > + return ret; > + } > + > switch (func) { > case 0: > ret = read_ldt(ptr, bytecount); > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c > index 86c95a8..ec1170d 100644 > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c > @@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max; > #ifndef CONFIG_MMU > extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages; > #endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL > +extern int sysctl_modify_ldt; > +#endif > > /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */ > #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR > @@ -963,6 +966,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { > .mode = 0644, > .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, > }, > +#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL > + { > + .procname = "modify_ldt", > + .data = &sysctl_modify_ldt, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0644, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_negperm, > + .extra1 = &neg_one, > + .extra2 = &one, > + }, > +#endif > #endif > #if defined(CONFIG_MMU) > { > -- > 1.7.12.1 > Yay for perm disable! Thank you! :) Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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