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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 12/12] x86/altp2m: XSM hooks for altp2m HVM ops



On 06/26/2015 03:35 PM, Ed White wrote:
On 06/26/2015 12:24 PM, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
On 06/22/2015 02:56 PM, Ed White wrote:
From: Ravi Sahita <ravi.sahita@xxxxxxxxx>

Signed-off-by: Ravi Sahita <ravi.sahita@xxxxxxxxx>

One comment, below.

[...]
diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if 
b/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if
index f4cde11..c95109f 100644
--- a/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if
+++ b/tools/flask/policy/policy/modules/xen/xen.if
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
   define(`declare_domain_common', `
       allow $1 $2:grant { query setup };
       allow $1 $2:mmu { adjust physmap map_read map_write stat pinpage 
updatemp mmuext_op };
-    allow $1 $2:hvm { getparam setparam };
+    allow $1 $2:hvm { getparam setparam altp2mhvm altp2mhvm_op };
       allow $1 $2:domain2 get_vnumainfo;
   ')

This allows any domain to enable altp2m on itself; I think you meant to
only allow altp2mhvm_op here, requiring a privileged domain to first
enable the feature on a domain before anyone can use it.


We certainly don't want to unconditionally disallow that. We want the
policy to offer the ability to choose whether it's allowed or not.
Does the patch do that?

Remove altp2mhvm from the above line, leaving only altp2mhvm_op here.  The
other line added to xen.if should still contain both. This makes the FLASK
policy match the no-XSM case, which I assume is what you've tested.

--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency

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