[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 00/12] Alternate p2m: support multiple copies of host p2m



On 22/06/15 19:56, Ed White wrote:
> This set of patches adds support to hvm domains for EPTP switching by creating
> multiple copies of the host p2m (currently limited to 10 copies).
>
> The primary use of this capability is expected to be in scenarios where access
> to memory needs to be monitored and/or restricted below the level at which the
> guest OS page tables operate. Two examples that were discussed at the 2014 Xen
> developer summit are:
>
>     VM introspection: 
>         http://www.slideshare.net/xen_com_mgr/
>         zero-footprint-guest-memory-introspection-from-xen
>
>     Secure inter-VM communication:
>         http://www.slideshare.net/xen_com_mgr/nakajima-nvf
>
> A more detailed design specification can be found at:
>     http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-06/msg01319.html
>
> Each p2m copy is populated lazily on EPT violations.
> Permissions for pages in alternate p2m's can be changed in a similar
> way to the existing memory access interface, and gfn->mfn mappings can be 
> changed.
>
> All this is done through extra HVMOP types.
>
> The cross-domain HVMOP code has been compile-tested only. Also, the 
> cross-domain
> code is hypervisor-only, the toolstack has not been modified.
>
> The intra-domain code has been tested. Violation notifications can only be 
> received
> for pages that have been modified (access permissions and/or gfn->mfn 
> mapping) 
> intra-domain, and only on VCPU's that have enabled notification.
>
> VMFUNC and #VE will both be emulated on hardware without native support.
>
> This code is not compatible with nested hvm functionality and will refuse to 
> work
> with nested hvm active. It is also not compatible with migration. It should be
> considered experimental.

Overall, this patch series is looking very good, and it would seem that
3rd party testing agrees!

~Andrew

_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.