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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCHv2 3/5] evtchn: use a per-event channel lock for sending events
On 16/06/15 10:51, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 16.06.15 at 11:34, <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On 16/06/15 10:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 15.06.15 at 17:48, <david.vrabel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> @@ -609,21 +662,18 @@ int evtchn_send(struct domain *ld, unsigned int
>>>> lport)
>>>> struct domain *rd;
>>>> int rport, ret = 0;
>>>>
>>>> - spin_lock(&ld->event_lock);
>>>> -
>>>> - if ( unlikely(!port_is_valid(ld, lport)) )
>>>> - {
>>>> - spin_unlock(&ld->event_lock);
>>>> + if ( unlikely(lport >= read_atomic(&ld->valid_evtchns)) )
>>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>> - }
>>>
>>> I don't think you really want to open code part of port_is_valid()
>>> (and avoid other parts of it) here? Or if really so, I think a comment
>>> should be added to explain it.
>>
>> The ld->valid_evtchns is the only field we can safely check without
>> ld->event_lock.
>>
>> We do check the channel state and the code that set this state uses the
>> full port_is_valid() call. I'll add a comment.
>
> Hmm, port_is_valid() also checks d->max_evtchns and d->evtchn.
> The latter is involved in evtchn_from_port(), so I can't see how
> you checking the channel's state _afterwards_ can leverage that
> whoever set this state did a full check.
>
> Another question is whether with the ->valid_evtchns check the
> ->evtchn check is necessary at all anymore. (The check against
> ->max_evtchns isn't wrong with the lock not held, i.e. could only
> end up being too strict, and hence the open coding would then
> still be questionable.)
Ok. I'll remove the d->evtchn check from port_is_valid() and use it.
David
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