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Re: [Xen-devel] [v3][PATCH 15/16] xen/vtd: enable USB device assignment



On 2015/6/16 13:58, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Chen, Tiejun
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 5:00 PM

On 2015/6/11 18:22, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Chen, Tiejun
Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2015 9:15 AM

Before we refine RMRR mechanism, USB RMRR may conflict with guest bios
region so we always ignore USB RMRR.

If USB RMRR conflicts with guest bios, the conflict is always there
before and after your refinement. :-)

Yeah :)


Now this can be gone when we enable
pci_force to check/reserve RMRR.

So what about this?

USB RMRR may conflict with guest bios region so we always ignore
USB RMRR. But now this can be checked to handle after we introduce
our policy mechanism.

USB RMRR may conflict with guest BIOS region. In such case, identity
mapping setup is simply skipped in previous implementation. Now we
can handle this scenario cleanly with new policy mechanism so previous
hack code can be removed now.

Will update.

Thanks
Tiejun




Signed-off-by: Tiejun Chen <tiejun.chen@xxxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx> except one small comment below

---
   xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h  |  1 -
   xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 11 ++---------
   xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/utils.c |  7 -------
   3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
index af1feef..af205f5 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.h
@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ do {                                                \

   int vtd_hw_check(void);
   void disable_pmr(struct iommu *iommu);
-int is_usb_device(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn);
   int is_igd_drhd(struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd);

   #endif /* _DMAR_H_ */
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index d7c9e1c..d3233b8 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2229,11 +2229,9 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
       /*
        * If the device belongs to the hardware domain, and it has RMRR, don't
        * remove it from the hardware domain, because BIOS may use RMRR at
-     * booting time. Also account for the special casing of USB below (in
-     * intel_iommu_assign_device()).
+     * booting time.

this code is run-time right?

According to one associated commit,

commit 8b99f4400b695535153dcd5d949b3f63602ca8bf
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Fri Oct 10 10:54:21 2014 +0200

      VT-d: fix RMRR related error handling

      - reassign_device_ownership() now tears down RMRR mappings (for other
        than Dom0)
      - to facilitate that, rmrr_identity_mapping() now deals with both
        establishing and tearing down of these mappings (the open coded
        equivalent in intel_iommu_remove_device() is being replaced at once)
      - intel_iommu_assign_device() now unrolls the assignment upon RMRR
        mapping errors
      - intel_iommu_add_device() now returns consistent values upon RMRR
        mapping failures (was: failure when last iteration ran into a
        problem, success otherwise)
      - intel_iommu_remove_device() no longer special cases Dom0 (it only
        ever gets called for devices removed from the _system_, not a domain)
      - rmrr_identity_mapping() now returns a proper error indicator instead
        of -1 when intel_iommu_map_page() failed

      Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
      Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>

This chunk of codes resides inside intel_iommu_remove_device() so I
think this shouldn't be for a running domain.


sorry I thought you meant intel_iommu_assign_device()) only used at
booting time. Wrong catch on the patch format. :-)

Thanks
Kevin



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