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[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 2/6] gnttab: limit mapcount() looping



The function doesn't need to return counts in the first place; all its
callers are after is whether at least one entry of a certain kind
exists. With that there's no point for that loop to continue once the
looked for condition was found to be met by one entry. Rename the
function to match the changed behavior.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static inline void
 double_gt_lock(struct grant_table *lgt, struct grant_table *rgt)
 {
     /*
-     * See mapcount() for why the write lock is also required for the
+     * See mapkind() for why the write lock is also required for the
      * remote domain.
      */
     if ( lgt < rgt )
@@ -566,14 +566,14 @@ static int grant_map_exists(const struct
     return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static void mapcount(
-    struct grant_table *lgt, struct domain *rd, unsigned long mfn,
-    unsigned int *wrc, unsigned int *rdc)
+#define MAPKIND_READ 1
+#define MAPKIND_WRITE 2
+static unsigned int mapkind(
+    struct grant_table *lgt, const struct domain *rd, unsigned long mfn)
 {
     struct grant_mapping *map;
     grant_handle_t handle;
-
-    *wrc = *rdc = 0;
+    unsigned int kind = 0;
 
     /*
      * Must have the local domain's grant table write lock when
@@ -586,15 +586,19 @@ static void mapcount(
      */
     ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked(&rd->grant_table->lock));
 
-    for ( handle = 0; handle < lgt->maptrack_limit; handle++ )
+    for ( handle = 0; !(kind & MAPKIND_WRITE) &&
+                      handle < lgt->maptrack_limit; handle++ )
     {
         map = &maptrack_entry(lgt, handle);
         if ( !(map->flags & (GNTMAP_device_map|GNTMAP_host_map)) ||
              map->domid != rd->domain_id )
             continue;
         if ( _active_entry(rd->grant_table, map->ref).frame == mfn )
-            (map->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) ? (*rdc)++ : (*wrc)++;
+            kind |= map->flags & GNTMAP_readonly ?
+                    MAPKIND_READ : MAPKIND_WRITE;
     }
+
+    return kind;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -819,24 +823,24 @@ __gnttab_map_grant_ref(
     need_iommu = gnttab_need_iommu_mapping(ld);
     if ( need_iommu )
     {
-        unsigned int wrc, rdc;
+        unsigned int kind;
         int err = 0;
 
         double_gt_lock(lgt, rgt);
 
         /* We're not translated, so we know that gmfns and mfns are
            the same things, so the IOMMU entry is always 1-to-1. */
-        mapcount(lgt, rd, frame, &wrc, &rdc);
+        kind = mapkind(lgt, rd, frame);
         if ( (act_pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask|GNTPIN_devw_mask)) &&
              !(old_pin & (GNTPIN_hstw_mask|GNTPIN_devw_mask)) )
         {
-            if ( wrc == 0 )
+            if ( !(kind & MAPKIND_WRITE) )
                 err = iommu_map_page(ld, frame, frame,
                                      IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
         }
         else if ( act_pin && !old_pin )
         {
-            if ( (wrc + rdc) == 0 )
+            if ( !kind )
                 err = iommu_map_page(ld, frame, frame, IOMMUF_readable);
         }
         if ( err )
@@ -1050,15 +1054,15 @@ __gnttab_unmap_common(
 
     if ( rc == GNTST_okay && gnttab_need_iommu_mapping(ld) )
     {
-        unsigned int wrc, rdc;
+        unsigned int kind;
         int err = 0;
 
         double_gt_lock(lgt, rgt);
 
-        mapcount(lgt, rd, op->frame, &wrc, &rdc);
-        if ( (wrc + rdc) == 0 )
+        kind = mapkind(lgt, rd, op->frame);
+        if ( !kind )
             err = iommu_unmap_page(ld, op->frame);
-        else if ( wrc == 0 )
+        else if ( !(kind & MAPKIND_WRITE) )
             err = iommu_map_page(ld, op->frame, op->frame, IOMMUF_readable);
 
         double_gt_unlock(lgt, rgt);



Attachment: gnttab-limit-mapcount-looping.patch
Description: Text document

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