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[Xen-devel] [xen-4.3-testing test] 58367: regressions - trouble: blocked/broken/fail/pass



flight 58367 xen-4.3-testing real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/58367/

Regressions :-(

Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 14 guest-localmigrate.2 fail REGR. vs. 
58060

Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin  3 host-install(3)              broken like 57749
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 15 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail like 57933
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt      11 guest-start                  fail   like 58060

Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
 test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386  1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64  1 build-check(1)               blocked n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64  9 debian-hvm-install     fail never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64  9 debian-hvm-install      fail never pass
 build-i386-rumpuserxen        6 xen-build                    fail   never pass
 build-amd64-rumpuserxen       6 xen-build                    fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu  6 xen-boot                     fail  never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf      6 xen-boot                     fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2   6 xen-boot                     fail   never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt     12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck  6 xen-boot                     fail never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop             fail never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop              fail never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl           6 xen-boot                     fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale   6 xen-boot                     fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt      6 xen-boot                     fail   never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 20 leak-check/check        fail never pass

version targeted for testing:
 xen                  9176955cb837ba0752ca7ca7a197c9c394468e9f
baseline version:
 xen                  e580a92dd53dbba62518e17a3f4ebd57b626926c

------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
  Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
  Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
------------------------------------------------------------

jobs:
 build-amd64                                                  pass    
 build-armhf                                                  pass    
 build-i386                                                   pass    
 build-amd64-libvirt                                          pass    
 build-armhf-libvirt                                          pass    
 build-i386-libvirt                                           pass    
 build-amd64-pvops                                            pass    
 build-armhf-pvops                                            pass    
 build-i386-pvops                                             pass    
 build-amd64-rumpuserxen                                      fail    
 build-i386-rumpuserxen                                       fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl                                          pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl                                          fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl                                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64                    pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-debianhvm-amd64                     pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64                    pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64                              pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64                         fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-rumpuserxen-amd64                           blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64                         fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                         fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale                                  fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2                                  pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2                                  fail    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck                               fail    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386                               pass    
 test-amd64-i386-rumpuserxen-i386                             blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt                                     pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt                                     fail    
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt                                      fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu                                pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu                                fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-pair                                        pass    
 test-amd64-i386-pair                                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin                                 pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin                                 broken  
 test-amd64-amd64-pv                                          pass    
 test-amd64-i386-pv                                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf                                     pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf                                     fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3                          fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3                           pass    


------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org
logs: /home/logs/logs
images: /home/logs/images

Logs, config files, etc. are available at
    http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs

Test harness code can be found at
    http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary

broken-step test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin host-install(3)

Not pushing.

------------------------------------------------------------
commit 9176955cb837ba0752ca7ca7a197c9c394468e9f
Author: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:50 2015 +0100

    QEMU_TAG update
========================================
commit 8fcecdca2dd1e6b4e78114977388ff0ddb85db20
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
    
    ... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's
    to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again,
    i.e. should be used only for trusted guests).
    
    This is part of XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>)

commit c2ce1e99e4e16adb1b9abe5f720604a895134a70
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions
    
    Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields
    read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need
    to be given explicit descriptors.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 5d688f2be26717ff45cb960dcd6f2fa71461bfb4
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields
    
    The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right
    (and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode
    (introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers
    and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in
    default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in
    permissive mode).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 9fa54a8818979ce375fa830402b5897996bbcc1a
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only
    
    xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read-
    only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought
    to be read-only in hardware).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 8599757a0a68333eca419e20561eaf49ab1f24e2
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space 
handling
    
    This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in
    multiple places.
    
    Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation
    is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it
    doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag
    is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is
    r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 6bfd2cd948aa1bed3272bf41c838cb11b9175234
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit
    
    xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C
    nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 54e3720bca9873e6e903b9488758f3777f4d55ba
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask
    
    There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing
    PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local
    emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field
    descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that
    xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later
    patches to be less intrusive.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 1c8bd2b55744d18db7e3ff3084765ec30e1c0fd2
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:25 2015 +0100

    xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications
    
    Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not
    get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based
    on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask).
    
    Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by
    qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will
    require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the
    security issue got addressed.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit bf53d1740edb05958c3e092e7c23cf9b1724cb06
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:14:05 2015 +0100

    xen/MSI-X: disable logging by default
    
    ... to avoid allowing the guest to cause the control domain's disk to
    fill.
    
    This is XSA-130.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 823757bf23f491d56a2d8353ddc838b83a3f8962
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:13:56 2015 +0100

    xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register
    
    It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not
    capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue
    nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects.
    
    This is XSA-129.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 835bc3eeba2cc52cc54b53578d78a2a7e56c54b6
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Wed Jun 10 14:13:52 2015 +0100

    xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents
    
    The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple
    fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message
    Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field).
    Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed
    fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in
    doing any host write.
    
    This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any
    host write attempt when already the host read failed.
    
    This is XSA-128.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

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