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[Xen-devel] [qemu-mainline test] 57872: regressions - FAIL



flight 57872 qemu-mainline real [real]
http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/57872/

Regressions :-(

Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
 build-amd64-xsm               5 xen-build                 fail REGR. vs. 57815
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 17 leak-check/check         fail REGR. vs. 57815
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64  9 windows-install   fail REGR. vs. 57815

Regressions which are regarded as allowable (not blocking):
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt      11 guest-start                  fail   like 57815
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt     11 guest-start                  fail   like 57815
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt     11 guest-start                  fail   like 57815

Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm       1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm        1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm  1 build-check(1)    blocked n/a
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm  1 build-check(1)     blocked n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm  1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm   1 build-check(1)               blocked  n/a
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel 11 guest-start                  fail  never pass
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd  11 guest-start                  fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale  12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm      12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu 12 migrate-support-check        fail  never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm 11 guest-start                  fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck 12 migrate-support-check        fail never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf     12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin 12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2  12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-armhf-armhf-xl          12 migrate-support-check        fail   never pass
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 16 guest-stop              fail never pass

version targeted for testing:
 qemuu                42d58e7c6760cb9c55627c28ae538e27dcf2f144
baseline version:
 qemuu                3fc827d591679f3e262b9d1f8b34528eabfca8c0

------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
  Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
  Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@xxxxxxxxxx>
  Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
------------------------------------------------------------

jobs:
 build-amd64-xsm                                              fail    
 build-armhf-xsm                                              pass    
 build-i386-xsm                                               pass    
 build-amd64                                                  pass    
 build-armhf                                                  pass    
 build-i386                                                   pass    
 build-amd64-libvirt                                          pass    
 build-armhf-libvirt                                          pass    
 build-i386-libvirt                                           pass    
 build-amd64-pvops                                            pass    
 build-armhf-pvops                                            pass    
 build-i386-pvops                                             pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl                                          pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl                                          pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl                                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm                blocked 
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64-xsm                 blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt-xsm                                 blocked 
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt-xsm                                 fail    
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt-xsm                                  blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-xsm                                      blocked 
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-xsm                                      pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-xsm                                       blocked 
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-amd                                  fail    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd                           pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64                    pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-debianhvm-amd64                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-amd64                              pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64                         pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-ovmf-amd64                          pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                         fail    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64                          fail    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-arndale                                  pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-credit2                                  pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-credit2                                  pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-cubietruck                               pass    
 test-amd64-i386-freebsd10-i386                               pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-pvh-intel                                fail    
 test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-libvirt                                     fail    
 test-armhf-armhf-libvirt                                     fail    
 test-amd64-i386-libvirt                                      fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-multivcpu                                pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-multivcpu                                fail    
 test-amd64-amd64-pair                                        pass    
 test-amd64-i386-pair                                         pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin                                 pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf-pin                                 pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf                                     pass    
 test-armhf-armhf-xl-sedf                                     pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3-vcpus1                     pass    
 test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3                           pass    
 test-amd64-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3                            pass    


------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on osstest.test-lab.xenproject.org
logs: /home/logs/logs
images: /home/logs/images

Logs, config files, etc. are available at
    http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs

Test harness code can be found at
    http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary


Not pushing.

------------------------------------------------------------
commit 42d58e7c6760cb9c55627c28ae538e27dcf2f144
Merge: 3fc827d c25bbf1
Author: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 16:47:31 2015 +0100

    Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/sstabellini/tags/xen-15-06-02-tag' 
into staging
    
    XSA 128 129 130 131
    
    # gpg: Signature made Tue Jun  2 16:46:38 2015 BST using RSA key ID 70E1AE90
    # gpg: Good signature from "Stefano Stabellini 
<stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>"
    
    * remotes/sstabellini/tags/xen-15-06-02-tag:
      xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
      xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions
      xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields
      xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only
      xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space 
handling
      xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit
      xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask
      xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications
      xen/MSI-X: limit error messages
      xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register
      xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents
    
    Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit c25bbf1545a53ac051f9e51d4140e397660c10ae
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
    
    ... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's
    to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again,
    i.e. should be used only for trusted guests).
    
    This is part of XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>)

commit a88a3f887181605f4487a22bdfb7d87ffafde5d9
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions
    
    Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields
    read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need
    to be given explicit descriptors.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 0ad3393ad032f76e88b4dbd04d36ad84dff75dd6
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields
    
    The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right
    (and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode
    (introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers
    and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in
    default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in
    permissive mode).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

commit 45ebe3916ab16f859ed930e92fbd52d84d5dcdaf
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only
    
    xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read-
    only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought
    to be read-only in hardware).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 0e7ef22136955169a0fd03c4e41af95662352733
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI config space 
handling
    
    This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in
    multiple places.
    
    Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation
    is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it
    doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag
    is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is
    r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit c4ff1e68c621928abc680266cad0a451686c403b
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit
    
    xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C
    nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS).
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit d61bb2482dc0c7426f451f23ba7e2748ae2cc06d
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask
    
    There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing
    PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local
    emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field
    descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that
    xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later
    patches to be less intrusive.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit d1d35cf4ffb6a60a356193397919e83306d0bb74
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:01 2015 +0000

    xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit modifications
    
    Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not
    get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based
    on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask).
    
    Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by
    qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will
    require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the
    security issue got addressed.
    
    This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit b38ec5ee7a581776bbce0bdaecb397632c3c4791
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:00 2015 +0000

    xen/MSI-X: limit error messages
    
    Limit error messages resulting from bad guest behavior to avoid allowing
    the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill.
    
    The first message in pci_msix_write() can simply be deleted, as this
    is indeed bad guest behavior, but such out of bounds writes don't
    really need to be logged.
    
    The second one is more problematic, as there guest behavior may only
    appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't take the mask-all bit
    into account. And then this shouldn't depend on host device state (i.e.
    the host may have masked the entry without the guest having done so).
    Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when an entry is unmasked.
    Instead, if they can't be made take effect right away, they should take
    effect on the next unmasking or enabling operation - the specification
    explicitly describes such caching behavior. Until we can validly drop
    the message (implementing such caching/latching behavior), issue the
    message just once per MSI-X table entry.
    
    Note that the log message in pci_msix_read() similar to the one being
    removed here is not an issue: "addr" being of unsigned type, and the
    maximum size of the MSI-X table being 32k, entry_nr simply can't be
    negative and hence the conditonal guarding issuing of the message will
    never be true.
    
    This is XSA-130.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 7611dae8a69f0f1775ba1a9a942961c2aa10d88e
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:00 2015 +0000

    xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register
    
    It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not
    capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue
    nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects.
    
    This is XSA-129.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 5c83b2f5b4b956e91dd6e5711f14df7ab800aefb
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 15:07:00 2015 +0000

    xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents
    
    The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple
    fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message
    Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field).
    Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed
    fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in
    doing any host write.
    
    This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any
    host write attempt when already the host read failed.
    
    This is XSA-128.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

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