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Re: [Xen-devel] Security policy ambiguities - XSA-108 process post-mortem

>>> On 19.01.15 at 21:36, <james.mckenzie@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 29/10/14 13:27, James Bulpin wrote:
>> George Dunlap writes ("Security policy ambiguities - XSA-108 process 
> post-mortem"):
>>> [snip]
>>> As far as I can tell we basically have the following options:
>>> 1. Never allow people to deploy during the embargo period.
>>> 2. Always allow people to deploy during the embargo period.
>>> 3. Have the security team attempt to evaluate the risk.
>>> 4. Have individual cloud operators evaluate the risk.
>>> This seems like a recipe for disaster.
> 1 and 3 seem like a recipe for disaster as organizations and individual 
> people
> who have become aware of issues may have legal and other obligations to 
> their
> users, it would also add a fairly strong incentive for a large operator not
> to share any issues that they, or a contractor, had found until they had
> completed a mitigation.
> Perhaps:
> 5) Have the security team discuss with the discoverer if fixes should be
> permitted during the embargo period before the discovery is announced to
> the list.

Even if this looks like a good idea from an abstract pov, I'm not sure
it's practical: In particular in the case where the security team
determines that by deployment learning about details of the
vulnerability might be possible, but the discoverer insists on allowing
deployment, we'd end up with a rather undesirable situation.


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