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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 00/11] Alternate p2m: support multiple copies of host p2m

On 01/13/2015 11:01 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 09/01/15 21:26, Ed White wrote:
>> This set of patches adds support to hvm domains for EPTP switching by 
>> creating
>> multiple copies of the host p2m (currently limited to 10 copies).
>> The primary use of this capability is expected to be in scenarios where 
>> access
>> to memory needs to be monitored and/or restricted below the level at which 
>> the
>> guest OS page tables operate. Two examples that were discussed at the 2014 
>> Xen
>> developer summit are:
>>     VM introspection: 
>>         http://www.slideshare.net/xen_com_mgr/
>>         zero-footprint-guest-memory-introspection-from-xen
>>     Secure inter-VM communication:
>>         http://www.slideshare.net/xen_com_mgr/nakajima-nvf
>> Each p2m copy is populated lazily on EPT violations, and only contains 
>> entries for
>> ram p2m types. Permissions for pages in alternate p2m's can be changed in a 
>> similar
>> way to the existing memory access interface, and gfn->mfn mappings can be 
>> changed.
>> All this is done through extra HVMOP types.
>> The cross-domain HVMOP code has been compile-tested only. Also, the 
>> cross-domain
>> code is hypervisor-only, the toolstack has not been modified.
>> The intra-domain code has been tested. Violation notifications can only be 
>> received
>> for pages that have been modified (access permissions and/or gfn->mfn 
>> mapping) 
>> intra-domain, and only on VCPU's that have enabled notification.
>> VMFUNC and #VE will both be emulated on hardware without native support.
>> This code is not compatible with nested hvm functionality and will refuse to 
>> work
>> with nested hvm active. It is also not compatible with migration. It should 
>> be
>> considered experimental.
> Having reviewed most of the series, I believe I now have a feeling for
> what you are trying to achieve, but I would like to discuss some of the
> design implications.
> The following is my understanding of the situation.  Please correct me
> if I have made a mistake.

Thanks for investing the time to do this. Maybe this first couple of days
would have gone more smoothly if something like this was in the cover letter.

With the exception of a couple of minor points, you are spot on.

> Currently, a domain has a single host p2m.  This contains the guest
> physical address mappings, and a combination of p2m types which are used
> by existing components to allow certain actions to happen.  All vcpus
> run with the same host p2m.
> A domain may have a number of nested p2ms (currently an arbitrary limit
> of 10).  These are used for nested-virt and are translated by the host
> p2m.  Vcpus in guest mode run under a nested p2m.
> This new altp2m infrastructure adds the ability to use a different set
> of tables in the place of the host p2m.  This, in practice, allows for
> different translations, different p2m types, different access permissions. 
> One usecase of alternate p2ms is to provide introspection information to
> out-of-guest entities (via the mem_event interface) or to in-guest
> entities (via #VE).
> Now for some observations and assumptions.
> It occurs to me that the altp2m mechanism is generic.  From the look of
> the series, it is mostly implemented in a generic way, which is great. 
> The only Intel specific bits appear to be the ept handling itself,
> 'vmfunc' instruction support and #VE injection to in-guest entities. 

That was my intention. I don't know enough about the state of AMD
virtualization to know if it can support these patches by emulating
vmfunc and #VE, but that was my target.

> I can't think of any reasonable case where the alternate p2m would want
> mappings different to the host p2m.  That is to say, an altp2m will map
> the same set of mfns to make a guest physical address space, but may
> differ in page permissions and possibly p2m types.

The set of mfn's is the same, but I do allow gfn->mfn mappings to be
modified under certain circumstances. One use of this is to point the
same VA to different physical pages (with different access permissions)
in different p2m's to hide memory changes.

> Given the above restriction, I believe a lot of the existing features
> can continue to work and coexist.  For generating mem_events, the
> permissions can be altered in the altp2m.  For injecting #VE, the altp2m
> type can change to the new p2m_ram_rw, so long as the host p2m type is
> compatible.  For both, a vmexit can occur.  Xen can do the appropriate
> action and also inject a #VE on its way back into the guest.
> One thing I have noticed while looking at the #VE stuff that EPT also
> supports A/D tracking, which might be quite a nice optimisation and
> forgo the need for p2m_ram_logdirty, but I think this should be treated
> as an orthogonal item.

This is far from my area of expertise, but I believe there is code in Xen
to use EPT D bits in migration.


> When shared ept/iommu is not in use, altp2m can safely be used by vcpus,
> as this will not interfere with the IOMMU permissions.
> Furthermore, I can't conceptually think of an issue against the idea of
> nestedp2m alternatives, following the same rule that the mapped mfns
> match up.  That should allow all existing nestedvirt infrastructure
> continue to work.
> Does the above look sensible, or have I overlooked something?
> ~Andrew

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