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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 01/21] xen/common: do not implicitly permit access to mapped I/O memory
Hi all,
Please forgot this patch. I've added it by mistake in my series.
Regards,
On 07/31/2014 04:00 PM, Julien Grall wrote:
> From: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@xxxxxxxxx>
>
> Currently, the XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping hypercall implicitly grants
> to a domain access permission to the I/O memory areas mapped in its
> guest address space. This conflicts with the presence of a specific
> hypercall (XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission) used to grant such a permission
> to a domain.
> This commit separates the functions of the two hypercalls by having only
> the latter be able to permit I/O memory access to a domain, and the
> former just performing the mapping after a permissions check on both the
> granting and the grantee domains.
>
> Signed-off-by: Arianna Avanzini <avanzini.arianna@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Eric Trudeau <etrudeau@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Viktor Kleinik <viktor.kleinik@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> xen/common/domctl.c | 36 ++++++++++--------------------------
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
> index 80b7800..04ecd53 100644
> --- a/xen/common/domctl.c
> +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
> @@ -917,7 +917,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
> u_domctl)
> break;
>
> ret = -EPERM;
> - if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) )
> + if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
> + !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
> break;
>
> ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn_end, add);
> @@ -930,40 +931,23 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t)
> u_domctl)
> "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
> d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
>
> - ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn_end);
> - if ( !ret )
> - {
> - ret = map_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
> - if ( ret )
> - {
> - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> - "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx
> ret:%ld\n",
> - d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
> - if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn_end) &&
> - is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> - printk(XENLOG_ERR
> - "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to
> [%lx,%lx]\n",
> - d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
> - }
> - }
> + ret = map_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
> + if ( ret )
> + printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
> + "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx
> ret:%ld\n",
> + d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, ret);
> }
> else
> {
> - int rc = 0;
> -
> printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
> "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
> d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
>
> - rc = unmap_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
> - ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn_end);
> - if ( !ret )
> - ret = rc;
> + ret = unmap_mmio_regions(d, gfn, nr_mfns, mfn);
> if ( ret && is_hardware_domain(current->domain) )
> printk(XENLOG_ERR
> - "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to
> [%lx,%lx]\n",
> - ret, rc ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id,
> - mfn, mfn_end);
> + "memory_map: error %ld removing dom%d access to
> [%lx,%lx]\n",
> + ret, d->domain_id, mfn, mfn_end);
> }
> /* Do this unconditionally to cover errors on above failure paths. */
> memory_type_changed(d);
>
--
Julien Grall
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